Tablighi Jamaat
Contents |
History
A
A Sunni Islamic missionary movement, the Tablighi Jamaat is nearly one hundred years old
The world has been gripped by the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic with more than a million people having been infected so far. More than 53,000 have died around the world while more than 2,12,000 have recovered. In India, the total number of cases exceeds 2,000 now. The number has doubled in very quick time and the biggest Covid-19 hotspot in the country has been the Tablighi Jamaat Markaz in Nizamuddin, New Delhi where a congregation of thousands of people took place between 1-15 March.
Attendees came from all over India and the world. Authorities jumped to act when 6 people who attended the congregation died in Telangana. So far, more than 9,000 people who either attended the congregation or came in contact with those who did have been quarantined across India. The crisis has also brought focus on the organisation at the centre of it, the Tablighi Jamaat.
What is Tablighi Jamaat?
The Tablighi Jamaat (Society for Spreading Faith) is a Sunni Islamic missionary movement that urges Muslims to return to a pure form of Sunni Islam and be religiously observant, especially with respect to dressing, personal behaviour, and rituals.
The founder, Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandhlawi, completed his education at a Deoband madrassa, and while working among the people of Mewat, often questioned how Islam could be renewed, outside of education. He decided that only with “physical movement” away from one’s original place, could one leave behind one’s “Esteem for life and its comfort” for the cause of God. In 1927, Tablighi Jamaat was founded.
What were the aims of Tablighi Jamaat?
It aimed to recapitulate the practices of Prophet Muhammed, from 7th Century AD, and was concerned with the rise of westernisation and secularisation, and not just the Hindu or Christian inroads into the Muslim community (conversions). In the mid 1920’s Ilyas enjoined upon his followers, the practice of gasht (preaching rounds) and adopting local village councils (Panchayats) — reaching out to Muslims who lived near a mosque and summoning them to study the Quran and pray.
In the introduction to Travellers in Faith, Mohammed Khalid Masud explains that the prohibition of da’wa (to call, or invite people) to non-Muslims was designed to avoid confrontation with Hindu revivalist movements of the time. Tablighi Jamaat avoided politics, and concentrated on religious reform and revival. However, this revivalism referred to the restoration of religious tradition, as established in Sufi orders, and schools of Islamic law. It rejected modernity as manifested in materialism or secularism, and its faith renewal movements were rooted deeply in local environments.
What did it evolve into and how was it viewed?
By the mid-1930s, Tablighi Jamaat had a programme of belief, which included, beyond the five pillars of Islam, and Islamic doctrinal staples, the following: Islamic education, modest Islamic dress and appearance (shaving the moustache, and allowing the beard to grow long), rejection of other religions, high regard for Muslims, propagating Islam, self-financing of tabligh trips, lawful means of earning a living, and strict avoidance of divisive and sectarian issues. (Source: Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama‘at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal) Tablighi Jamaat’s disinterest in politics or power is what enabled it to gain followers in post-independence India, and eventually across the world, while functioning without any state control. Its benign nature ensured that it was not banned in India like other Islamist or religious organisations, and its center continues in Nizamuddin, in the heart of New Delhi.
A contrary view is that Tablighi Jamaat being ‘apolitical’, (but with followers preaching and espousing a religious way of life) is indeed its political stance. A piece in livemint, states that while Tablighi Jamaat does not preach anything not already taught in Islam, it prefers to be selective, in terms of which parts of the religion it focuses on. The piece cites Mushirul Hasan, former Vice Chancellor of Jamia Millia Islamia, who says that Tablighi Jamaat's claim that it is apolitical is “very convenient.” According to him “no movement is apolitical, every movement has an objective.” Some of the suspicion against the Tablighi Jamaat also arises from the source of its funds, as no one knows how much and from where the money comes in, though members say people donate whatever they want, and the money is used in the markaz.
Tablighi Jamaat is often considered extremely orthodox in its interpretations, with the ability to convert Muslims into radical believers. However, personalising religion, making it an individual’s path, and following a distinction between deen and duniya (religion and politics), Tablighi Jamaat has allowed its followers to come to terms with a secular state. Without a central political power, individuals and their relationship with religion is the primary target of reform.
What have been some criticisms surrounding it?
Yoginder Sikand, author of Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jama’t, cites in an essay that even within the Muslim world, Tablighi Jamaat has received severe criticism. Arshad ul-qadri, an Indian Barelvi ideologue alleged that it was set up by colonial rulers of India to create dissension among Muslims, to blunt their spirit of jihad. The other criticisms has been that in insisting on the separation of religion from politics — defect secularism — Tablighi Jamaat is a dream of enemies of Islam who dread the prospect of Muslims acquiring political power. Further, it teaches jihad as personal purification (jihad al-nafs — a war with an individual’s own desires) rather than holy war, and has been disapproved by clerics in Saudi Arabia, where it is officially banned.
According to Pew Research Centre, the group’s missionary activities and loose organisational structure can be exploited by radical elements. In many countries, including India, radicals and terrorists have been associated with it. A piece in livemint , cites Ajit Doval as saying that, “There is a culture of secretism in the organisation, which develops suspicion.” But he goes on to assert that the movement was “never viewed adversely by the government.” However, there are important complexities that need to be understood, beyond the organisation as simply being black or white. The piece cites counter terrorism expert Ajai Sahni, who says, “It has been accepted by India as a religious proselytising organisation with no direct contribution to terror, but what has been found is that some people who were part of it have ended up in radicalisation formations. It is an international organisation with intimate links to the Pakistan Tablighi Jamaat. People are brought in from Pakistan as proselytisers which creates a potential for suspicion. This puts into question the general orientation of the organisation. Deep immersion in any religion, not just Islam, can lead to radicalisation.”
What has Tablighi Jamaat meant across the world?
According to Pew Research Centre, Tablighi Jamaat operates roughly in 150 countries around the world, including Western Europe, Africa, and South Asia. It is hard to monitor and supervise because there are so many, and temporary participants often make the group’s membership. Because of a lack of centralised control, missionaries improvise, rather than follow a standard strategy. As a result, the impact often tends to depend on the methods, intentions, and inclinations of local leaders.
In the British town of Dewsbury, Tablighi Jamaat functions as regional headquarters coordinating activities throughout Northern Europe. Other centers, often focus on local concerns, or serving ethnic populations. In Barcelona, it has geared to the needs of the immigrants of North African origin. In France, while there is a center, most Tablighi groups operate independently, building relationships with local mosques. In Germany, Tablighis have found it difficult to penetrate Muslim communities, comprised largely of immigrants from Turkey — where the Tablighi Jamaat has virtually no presence. And in Western Europe, it has adapted to the reality of religious, social and political pluralism in the region, and has shown a willingness to partner with non-Muslim political institutions to further its ends. In South Asia too, the Tablighi Jamaat has a great following, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Thailand.
B
Stanly Johny, Who are the Tablighi Jamaat?, April 2, 2020: The Hindu
The Tablighi Jamaat, a little known Islamic organisation, has been at the centre of a controversy after dozens of people who attended a religious congregation the group held at its headquarters in Delhi in March tested positive for COVID-19. At least 2,000 people, both from across the country and foreign nations such as Indonesia and Malaysia, had attended the gathering in Nizamuddin that started in early March and went on for a couple of weeks. Maulana Saad Kandhalvi, leader of the group, has been booked by the Delhi police under the Epidemic Disease Act.
Who and what exactly is this group?
Origins
The Tablighi Jamaat (Society of Preachers) was founded by a Deobandi Islamic scholar Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandhlawi in Mewat, India, in 1926. As its name suggests, Al-Kandhlawi’s goal was to establish a group of dedicated preachers as a Muslim revivalist society, who could revive “true” Islam, which he saw was not being practised by many Muslims. The slogan Al-Kandhlawi coined for his new organisation captured the essence of its activities — “Oh Muslims, become true Muslims”.
Al-Kandhlawi called upon his fellow Muslims to “enjoin the good and forbid the evil”. This was also a time when Islam and Hinduism had seen several revivalist streams in Asia. India had seen the rise of the Deobandi school in the second half of the 19th century. Scholars like Jamal ad-Din Afghani and Mohammed Abduh called for reformation of faith through their Salafi preachings. In India, Hinduism was seeing revivalist movements such as the Shuddhi Movement in the early 20th century. Al-Kandhlawi’s mission was also to revive his faith, but based on its core teachings and lifestyle of its early leaders. Also in Mewat where the Tablighi was founded, the Meos Muslims, a Rajput ethnic group, had followed syncretic traditions. Al-Kandhlawi wanted to end it all through dawa (proselytising). He sent his volunteers to villages to spread “the message of Allah”.
The organisation grew fast in British India. In its annual conference held in November 1941, some 25,000 people attended. After Partition, it grew stronger in Pakistan and East Pakistan (lately Bangladesh). Now, Tablighi’s largest national wing is in Bangladesh. The group has presence in 150 countries and millions of followers.
Ideology and organisation
Inspired by the Deobandi creed, the Tablighis urge fellow Muslims to live like the Prophet did. They are theologically opposed to the syncretic nature of Sufi Islam and insist on its members to dress like the Prophet did (trouser or robe should be above the ankle). Men usually shave their upper lip and keep long beard. The focus of the organisation was not on converting people from other faiths into Islam. Rather, it is focussed on ‘purifying’ the Muslim faith. The organisation has a loose structure. The Emir is the leader of the international movement and is always related to the group’s founder Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandhlawi. The current leader, Maulana Saad Kandhalvi, is the grandson of the founder. The group also has a Shura Council, which is largely an advisory council with different national units and national headquarters.
Activities
The Tablighi Jamaat members have declared they are not political. They have also decried violence in the name of religion. They say the Prophet Mohammed has commanded all Muslims to convey the message of Allah, and the Tablighis take this as their duty. They divide themselves into small Jamaats (societies) and travel frequently across the world to spread the message of Islam to Muslim houses. During this travel, they stay in local mosques.
The group’s modus operandi is peaceful and it is focussed entirely on the Muslim community worldwide. “There is a culture of secretism in the organisation, which develops suspicion,” Ajit Doval, now India’s National Security Adviser and a former intelligence boss, said in 2013. “The movement was never viewed adversely by the government.” But the Tablighi Jamaat has been banned in some Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, whose governments see its puritanical preachings as extremist.
C
Tablighi Jamaat: The group blamed for new Covid-19 outbreak in India, April 2, 2020: BBC
The Tablighi Jamaat have come into the spotlight after an event they held in the Indian capital Delhi has spawned a number of Covid-19 clusters across the country. But exactly who is this group and why did they hold a big gathering in Delhi? BBC Hindi's Zubair Ahmed reports.
Who are the Tablighi Jamaat?
The organisation was founded in 1926 in the northern Indian region of Mewat by prominent Islamic scholar Maulana Mohammed Ilyas Kandhlawi. Its aim was to inculcate "true" Islam among the "Umma" (Global Islamic community) - many Muslims at the time felt that their political and religious identities were being compromised under the British Raj.
The organisation flourished in what was then undivided India. This did not change when the country was partitioned after independence in 1947. It has a strong following in both Pakistan and Bangladesh.
What is its mission?
The Jamaat's founder, Mohammed Ilyas, once famously said, "Oh Muslims be good Muslims" - and that is in essence, the organisation's main objective - to promote the ideals of Islam among Muslims.
Its members claim that it is a non-political organisation which aims to build an Islamic society based on the teachings of the Koran. The Jamaat sends out delegates to different countries for 40 days a year and sometimes for shorter durations. The preachers believe in person-to-person contact, so they knock on the doors of ordinary Muslims to give them the message of Islam.
What happened in Delhi?
The Delhi conference, an annual event, was inaugurated on 3 March though there are differing accounts of when it may have ended. What is clear is that once it ended many people - including 250 foreigners - chose to stay on.
It is thought that some of them were carrying the Covid-19 infection, that has now been transported across the country.
One of its members, Waseem Ahmed, told BBC Hindi that hundreds of delegates left before the lockdown came into effect on 24 March, but that more than 1,000 followers, including many foreigners, got stranded, as all modes of transport and international flights were cancelled.
Since then, police have cleared out the hostel where these foreign nationals were staying and quarantined them in another location in Delhi. Efforts are now on in every state to trace and test people who were at the event as the number of Covid-19 cases linked to the event steadily rises. On Thursday morning, local media put that number at 389.
How large is the group?
Tablighi Jamaat is now a global religious movement, with followers in more than 80 countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia and the US.
The Jamaat has its own headquarters in every country it operates in, but its global spiritual centre remains the Markaz (centre) in Delhi.
This is housed in a multi-storey building in Nizamuddin, a prominently Muslim residential area in Delhi. The Markaz comprises a mosque and dormitories that can accommodate 5,000 people.
The Jamaat also organises big events in other countries. In Bangladesh, it holds an event called the Biswa Ijtema which is believed to be the second-largest gathering of Muslims in the world after the Haj.
The group also has some famous South Asian personalities as its followers.
Some of its more famous followers include members of Pakistan's national cricket team, including 90s batting stars Shahid Afridi and Inzamam ul-Haq. South African cricketer Hashim Amla is also a follower.
Former Pakistani Presidents, Farooq Legari and Mohammed Rafiq Tarar were also believed to be the followers while former Indian president Dr Zakir Hussain was also associated with the movement.
D
Islamic religious outfit Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) has earned plenty of bad publicity after the recent spike in COVID-19 cases in India. This explainer will help you understand the history, organisational structure and functioning of the organisation.
What is Tablighi Jamaat (TJ)?
It is a Sunni Islamic missionary movement engaged in spreading the religion. The name Tablighi Jamaat means 'outreach society to spread the faith’.
When was TJ formed? How big is the organisation?
It was formed by Deobandi Islamic scholar Maulana Muhammad Ilyas Khandhalawi in 1927 in Mewat. In just two decades, the organisation grew bigger and established units in many parts of north India. At present, it has 150-250 million members. It has good presence in Kerala too.
In Pakistan, TJ is headquartered in Raiwing in Lahore. The Pakistan chapter was formed after the partition of India. Bangladesh chapter is headquartered in Tongi. TJ has good presence in the United States, United Kingdom, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.
What is Deobandi movement?
Deobandi is a Sunni revivalist movement formed around Darul Uloom Islamic seminary in Uttar Pradesh's Deoband town. It was formed to oppose British colonialism, which the scholars thought, was corrupting Islam.
What is the organisational structure of TJ? TJ does not have a defined organisational structure. But it has a hierarchic network of elders. The head of the congregation was known as Ameer. The post was abolished after the death Maulana Inamul Hasan Kandhlawi, who headed the organisation from 1965 to 1995. Now, an international advisory council (Alami Shura) charts out the organisation's plans.
What are the basic tenets of TJ?
Kalimah (declaration of faith), Salat (five-time prayers), Ilm-o-Zikr (knowledge), Ikraam-e-Muslim (Respect of Muslim), Ikhlas-e-Niyyat (Sincerity of intention) and Tafrigh-i-Waqt (sparing time). TJ members work only among Muslims and teach them the life practised by Prophet Muhammad.
Is the organisation hit by factionalism?
Yes, the outfit has been hit by factionalism since the death of Zubair ul Hasan Kandhlawi, grandson of Maulana Muhammad Zakariyya al-Kandhlawi. Now TJ has three prominent factions (or camps), one each in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
What is Markaz Nizamuddin, where the prayer meeting was held recently?
It is the India headquarters of TJ. Markaz means centre. It is headed by Maulana Saad Kandhalwi, great-grandson of Maulana Muhammad Ilyas. TJ workers, who pass through Delhi before and after their preaching tours, visit the headquarters so often. These visits are scheduled well in advance. Markaz functions like a hostel and can accommodate more than 8,000 people at any given point of time. Workers take part in instructional activities while they are at the Markaz.
How does a congregation function?
At the congregation, various small groups of preachers are constituted. A senior member is anointed the leader of the group. These groups visit designated destinations through mosques to spread Islamic practices among Muslims.
Analysis of the role
Jenny Taylor, September 8, 2009: The Guardian
The problem with this 'extremist' sect is not that it proselytises, but it seems to have so little contact with the outside world.
The Tablighi Jamaat is the most successful of the many such groups to form after the Mutiny (known to India, where it comes from, as the Uprising) in the mid-19th century. Eighty million-strong today, the group shuns the harsh outside world, and creates an atmosphere of spirituality, solidarity and purpose among themselves that proves extremely compelling. Deobandi-inspired, adherents are interested only in reviving the faith of weaker Muslims, and thus helping to ensure either a passport to paradise, or the rule of Islam on earth, whichever comes soonest.
Neither is the Tablighi Jamaat "ultraorthodox" – in fact rather the opposite. Ghayasuddin Siddiqui, founder of the Muslim Institute and godfather of the Quilliam Foundation, is against the huge 12,000-capacity mosque the sect wishes to build in Newham because, as he told me, he believes they peddle "fairy tales”.
Their reliance on unorthodox stories of mythical heroes, their other-worldliness and pietism, their veneration for the founder and his family, and their ritualisation of certain select scriptures and practises like the chilla – a 40-day preaching tour all are obliged to undertake annually – has led one scholar to conclude that they function like a sufi order, something that the "ultraorthodox" Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia for example completely condemn.
It is because they are not activist enough that frustrated young zealots become fodder for the shadowy jihadi-groomers who infiltrate their ranks, say some.
Anthropologist Roger Ballard has for many years accused policy-makers and journalists of "protestantising" Hinduism and Islam in Britain. In their avowed intent to render all religions "equal", they also render them all the same – and thereby betray their ignorance about very real and urgent differences. Christianity reaches out to others and thereby saves itself the corrupting effects of the ghetto – privatisation, stagnation and paranoia. Islam in Britain too often wants to remain aloof, uncontaminated – and unreal.
To have harboured terrorists does not necessarily mean that Tablighi Jamaat is therefore a hotbed of terrorism, but it does mean we need to take it much more seriously. We should not allow this strange parallel world to continue. Newham Council has for two years failed to enforce planning requirements on the Tablighi Jamaat mosque next to the Olympic stadia – the very mosque which organised gatherings attended by Abdullah Ahmed Ali.
Instead of patronising and protestantising the Tablighi Jamaat, Christians in particular need to acknowledge the spiritual hunger of young men yearning for meaning, identity and a heroic role in life, as indeed is happening at the Springfield Project in Birmingham, opened by the Archbishop of Canterbury.
Where secular Britain fails is where Tablighi Jamaat wins. One Muslim responding toa blog post on my website about the Tablighi Jamaat says: "TJ is the best thing that ever happened to me." We need to understand why that should be so. And that means engaging with real Muslims as friends, and real Islam as an accountable social entity. It means getting mosques registered for civil marriages for instance, and enforcing the same planning controls as for any other building.
Jihad and the TJ
A source of strength, May 10, 2018: The Times of India
Tablighis are simply exercising their fundamental rights. They must be allowed to dress and behave according to the guidelines of their religion so long as they do not threaten, harm or force their religion on others.
You can debate the implications of Tablighi Jamaat’s popularity for transitioning Myanmar but we have found no indication that Tablighis were seeking to convert non-Buddhists or that they are involved in armed movements – two common accusations levelled against Myanmar’s Muslims by some Buddhists. In fact, we found precisely the opposite: doing so would violate the principles, the six pillars, that Tablighis have committed themselves to. Fundamentalism is not the same as extremism or radicalism.
And this is precisely why the story of Tablighi Jamaat needs to be told: to improve understanding of Islam and its principles among non-Muslims. A Muslim man wearing a kurta or a woman wearing a burqa must not be seen as a threat. Frontier believes they should be seen as citizens who are expressing their faith in the manner of their choosing, in line with the rights explicitly given to them under the 2008 constitution.
But as we have seen many times in Myanmar, the text of a law – even the constitution – is no guarantee that rights will be upheld or respected. The most effective way to fight fear and extremism is through dialogue, education and understanding.
When communities are divided and separated, mistruths and misunderstandings can fester, creating the tinder for conflict that can ignite at the smallest spark, the slightest provocation. When communities understand each other, when there is mutual trust and conflict can more easily be avoided. Religious leaders of all religions and beliefs have a responsibility to preach tolerance and inclusivity.
But they have a further responsibility. For Myanmar to achieve an inclusive future, it is also incumbent on all sides to engage, including Tablighi Jamaat leaders and followers. At the same time, space must be made for everyone to participate in society without being forced to compromise on their beliefs.
Isolation from the mainstream is not the answer. It risks creating or reinforcing the “plural society” that the colonial administrator JS Furnivall conceptualised, where people “mix but do not combine”.
Religious beliefs can create division, but they can also be a source of strength. It is a strength that Myanmar needs to draw upon in this challenging period of its transition.
Details
Tablighi Jamaat: An Indirect Line to Terrorism, January 23, 2008: Stratfor
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart Spanish police conducted a series of raids on apartment buildings, a mosque and a prayer hall in Barcelona on Jan. 19, seizing bombmaking materials and arresting 14 men who allegedly were planning to attack targets in the city. Spanish Interior Minister Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba said the detainees were Islamists belonging to a "well-organized group that had gone a step beyond radicalization." A Muslim leader in Barcelona was quoted in some media reports as saying the 14 suspects — 12 Pakistanis, an Indian and a Bangladeshi — were members of a "Pakistani-based group called Tablighi Jamaat." The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) name has come up before in connection with terrorism plots, including the October 2002 Portland Seven and the September 2002 Lackawanna Six cases in the United States, as well as the August 2006 plot to bomb airliners en route from London to the United States, the July 7, 2005, London Underground bombings and the July 2007 attempted bombings in London and Glasgow, Scotland. Over the past several years we also have received several queries about TJ from U.S. law enforcement officials who are concerned about the group's presence and activities in the United States. This, then, is a good time to correct some of the erroneous information regarding TJ — and attempt to paint a realistic portrait of the very real threat posed by some of the people affiliated with TJ.
Tablighi Jamaat
The Tablighi Jamaat (Group for Preaching) movement was established in Mewat, India, in 1927 and stems from the Deobandi brand of the Hanafi Sunni school of jurisprudence. Deobandi is the most commonly practiced form of Islam in South Asia, and TJ is but a small subset of the larger Deobandi community. TJ was designed to be an apolitical, pietistic organization that sends missionaries across the globe on proselytizing missions intended to bring wayward Muslims back to more orthodox practices of Islam. TJ followers (Tablighis) are mostly of South Asian origin, though there are Tablighis from many different ethnic and national backgrounds. In fact, TJ operates in 150 countries and has an estimated 70 million to 80 million active followers, making it the largest Muslim movement in the world. Its annual gatherings in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh reportedly bring together the largest congregations of Muslims in the world outside of the Hajj. The group's stated mission is to work at a grassroots level, reaching out to Muslims across the social and economic spectrum. Tablighis do not solicit or receive donations, but rather are largely funded by senior members. At face value, TJ is a peaceful, egalitarian and devotional movement that stresses individual faith and overall spiritual development. In a sense, TJ is a widespread training system that urges average Muslims to examine their own lives and become involved in calling their fellow Muslims back to orthodox Islam. Because of TJ's tactics, some Islamist groups refer to its members as "Muslim Jehovah's Witnesses" and accuse them of abandoning politics and jihad. Upon joining the movement, Tablighi recruits are given the option of attending the Tablighi center in the Pakistani city of Raiwind, near Lahore, Pakistan, for four months of additional religious training to equip them to preach the Tablighi message. It is important to understand that TJ is a loosely controlled mass movement rather than a centralized group, as some would maintain. Although TJ operates mosques, it has no fixed membership and Tablighis are free to leave the movement. The mosques are used to support the efforts of the independent jamaat (groups of 10 preachers) that undertake preaching missions. The type of work performed and the duration of that work are left solely to the discretion and conscience of the individual jamaat. Some jamaat choose to serve a short period of time while others preach for months or even years. Although TJ is Deobandi, it allows any Sunni Muslim to join in its missionary work as long as that person accepts the group's austere creed. Because of the large number of South Asian Muslims in the United Kingdom, TJ is very strong in that country. The Tablighi-run Markazi Mosque in Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, is the group's European headquarters. The organization's strength in Britain was demonstrated in 2007 when it announced plans to construct an 18-acre mosque complex in STRATFORd, East London, on a site near the 2012 Olympic Park. According to some reports, the new complex would have a capacity of up to 70,000 people, making it the largest religious building in the United Kingdom and the largest mosque in Europe. The construction of such an enormous mosque has raised some concerns and more than a bit of controversy among the British people. The organization, however, also has a presence in most other European countries, while French authorities have claimed that 80 percent of the radical Islamists they have encountered have had some sort of contact with the TJ movement. In the United States, the FBI believes some 50,000 people are associated with TJ missions, while Tablighi mosques currently operate in several U.S. states, including California, Texas and New York. The Al-Falah Mosque in the Corona area of Queens, N.Y., apparently is the group's North American headquarters.
The Wahhabi/Salafi Myth
In addition to the misconception that TJ is a hierarchical group, perhaps the second most commonly held misconception about the Tablighis is that they adhere to a Wahhabi branch of Islam. In much the same way that there are different denominations of Christians, there are several different branches and sub-branches of Islam. Wahhabism, sometimes also referred to as Salafism, is an orthodox belief system held by the Saudi ruling family and most people in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism also is the form of Islam practiced by al Qaeda and many militant jihadist groups. In fact, the Deobandi Tablighis often are severely criticized by orthodox religious authorities (ulema), such as Sunni Wahhabi ulema in Saudi Arabia, who have issued fatwa prohibiting the Tablighis from preaching in the country and banning Tablighi literature from being imported into the country. The Wahhabi ulema have issued rulings declaring Tablighis to be deviants and forbidding participation in Tablighi activities unless the reason for the participation is to criticize the Tablighis for their deviant beliefs. Remember that not all Wahhabi or Salafi Muslims are jihadists and not all radical Islamists are Wahhabi/Salafi — or even Sunni for that matter. Many groups ascribing to a jihadist theology, such as the Taliban, are Deobandi. Hezbollah is a Shiite organization, while Jamaat al Fuqra has Sufi leanings. Tablighis also are heavily criticized by militant Deobandi Islamists, such as the Taliban, Kashmiri militant groups, anti-Shiite sectarian militant groups and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) for their apolitical stance regarding the war on terrorism, which many Muslims perceive as a war against Islam. Tablighi theology stresses that Muslims must first devote themselves to becoming good, practicing Muslims in their own personal lives, rather than struggling for political power or even protesting oppression by non-Muslims. This focus on the inner person first is the opposite approach to that taken by radical Islamists, who seek to seize political power through force and then form an Islamic state or caliphate that can impose Shariah law on the individual. Because of this, some Islamist militants accuse the Tablighis of being a tool of the Jews and Hindus because they deny the need for a physical jihad and focus on the "greater jihad," which is the inner struggle for faith and piety.
The Tablighi Role in the Global Jihadism
However, there are indeed some links between Tablighis and the world of jihadism. First, there is evidence of indirect connections between the group and the wider radical/extremist Deobandi nexus composed of anti-Shiite sectarian groups, Kashmiri militants and the Taliban. This link provides a medium through which Tablighis who are disgruntled with the group's apolitical program could break orbit and join militant organizations. One apparent manifestation of this nexus was a purported militant offshoot of TJ, Jihad bi al-Saif (Jihad through the Sword), which was established in Taxila, Pakistan. Members of this group were accused of plotting a coup against former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1995. Yet, because of the organization's extreme secrecy, little is known about it other than that it is believed to have developed in reaction to the TJ's apolitical, peaceful stance. The TJ organization also serves as a de facto conduit for Islamist extremists and for groups such as al Qaeda to recruit new members. Significantly, the Tablighi recruits do intersect with the world of radical Islamism when they travel to Pakistan to receive their initial training. We have received reports that once the recruits are in Pakistan, representatives of various radical Islamist groups, such as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the Taliban and al Qaeda, are said to woo them actively — to the point of offering them military training. And some of them accept the offer. For example, John Walker Lindh — an American who is serving a prison sentence for aiding the Taliban in Afghanistan — traveled with Tablighi preachers to Pakistan in 1998 to further his Islamic studies before joining the Taliban. Because of the piety and strict belief system of the Tablighis and their focus on calling wayward Muslims back to an austere and orthodox Muslim faith, the movement has offered a place where jihadist spotters can look for potential recruits. These facilitators often offer enthusiastic new or rededicated Muslims a more active way to live and develop their faith. Although the TJ promotes a benign message, the same conservative Islamic values espoused by the Tablighis also are part of jihadist ideology, and so some Muslims attracted to the Tablighi movement are enticed into becoming involved with jihadists. Additionally, because of its apolitical belief system, TJ seems to leave a gap in the ideological indoctrination of the individual Tablighi because it essentially asks the novice to shun politics and public affairs. The problem in taking this belief system from theory to practice, however, is that some people find they cannot ignore what is happening in the world around them, especially when that world includes wars. This is when some Tablighis become disillusioned with TJ and start turning to jihadist groups that offer religiously sanctioned prescriptions as to how "good Muslims" should deal with life's injustices. Once a facilitator identifies such candidates, he often will segregate them from the main congregation in the mosque or community center and put them into small prayer circles or study groups where they can be more easily exposed to jihadist ideology. (Of course, it also has been shown that a person with friends or relatives who ascribe to radical ideology can more easily be radical). Examples of people making the jump from TJ to radical Islam are the two leading members of the cell responsible for the July 7, 2005, London bombings — Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shahzad Tanweer. Both had life-changing experiences through their exposure to TJ, though by 2001 the men had left the Tablighi mosque they had been attending in the British city of Beeston, because they found it to be too apolitical. They apparently were frustrated by the mosque's elders, who forbid the discussion of politics in the mosque. After Khan and Tanweer left the Tablighi mosque, they began attending the smaller Iqra Learning Center bookstore in Beeston, where they reportedly were exposed to frequent political discussions about places such as Iraq, Kashmir and Chechnya. The store's proprietors reportedly even produced jihad videos depicting crimes by the West against the Muslim world. Exposed to this environment, the two men eventually became radicalized to the point of traveling to Pakistan to attend a terrorist training camp and then returning to the United Kingdom to plan and execute a suicide attack that resulted in the death of them both. TJ also is used by jihadists as cover both for recruiting activities, as discussed above, and for travel. Like Khan and Tanweer, many jihadists desire to travel to Pakistan for training, while others want to get to Afghanistan, Kashmir or other places to fight jihad. However, the travel environment is far different today than it was in the early 1980s, when 747 jetliners packed with jihadists from Saudi Arabia and other places flew into Pakistan en route to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Foreigners traveling to Pakistan today cannot enter the country without a visa, and Pakistani authorities are no longer inclined to issue visas to jihadists, as Jeffrey Battle and the other members of the Portland Seven had to learn the hard way. Shortly after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the friends traveled to China with the intention of entering Afghanistan by way of Pakistan. Once at the Chinese-Pakistani border, however, they found they could not enter Pakistan without a visa. After spending a frustrating month trying to obtain visas from the Pakistani Embassy in Beijing, the seven aspiring jihadists decided to go their separate ways. Battle, who reportedly once served as a bodyguard for Black Panther leader Quanell X, later attempted to obtain a visa to Pakistan by saying he was affiliated with TJ. The Pakistanis, probably recognizing him from his prior (and apparently somewhat vocal) visa attempts, denied him again, though he was able to get a visa to travel to Bangladesh using the feigned connection to TJ. Unable to make his way from Bangladesh to Pakistan or Afghanistan, however, Battle returned to the United States, where he was later arrested. He was sentenced to 18 years in prison after pleading guilty to charges of seditious conspiracy and waging war against the United States. Similarly, in the spring of 2001 the members of the so-called Lackawanna Six cell traveled to Pakistan under the pretext of studying the Islamic religion and culture at the TJ training center. In reality, the men traveled through Pakistan to Afghanistan, where they attended training at the al-Farooq camp, a training site being run by al Qaeda. Again, the men used TJ as cover for travel, though there is no indication that TJ played any real part in their alleged plot. Although the TJ organization unintentionally serves as a front for, or conduit to, militant organizations such as al Qaeda, there is no evidence that the Tablighis act willingly as a global unified jihadist recruiting arm. Rather, such activities appear to occur without the knowledge or consent of TJ leaders. Additionally, because of the very size of the organization and it activities in Muslim communities in the West, a great many Muslims have had some sort of contact with the group. TJ itself, however, is not an intentional propagator of terrorism.
International presence
Rakhine state
MRATT KYAW THU, The rise of the Tablighi Jamaat movement, May 24, 2018: Frontier Myanmar
Frontier’s senior correspondent Mratt Kyaw Thu charts the rise of the Tablighi Jamaat movement and the deep divisions its growing popularity has created within the Muslim community.
THE YOMA THITSAR minibus pulls into the terminal at Taungok, in southern Rakhine State. The driver has been warned several times not to enter the town, but by the time he notices the angry crowd that has gathered at the station, it’s too late. They storm onto the bus, dragging passengers off the vehicle. Ten people are killed, either stabbed or beaten to death.
Many will recognise this as one of the key events of communal violence that erupted in Rakhine State in June 2012. The killings in Taungok are often considered a retributive act; a week earlier, three Muslim men had been arrested for the alleged rape and murder of a Buddhist woman in nearby Ramree Township.
What is less known though is that those killed were reported to be Tablighis: followers of Tablighi Jamaat, an Islamic movement known for its missionary work that has variously been described as “fundamentalist”, “conservative” or “revivalist”.
The Rakhine Inquiry Commission’s final report, released in July 2013, said the group had been returning from Rathedaung Township in northern Rakhine State, where they had “exhorted Bengalis to build a mosque” and promised to provide the necessary funds. The commission added that “many Rakhine became extremely resentful of this Tablighi group” and the episode “increased the intensity of Rakhine patriotic sentiment and fuelled their anger”.
Frontier was unable to confirm independently that those killed on June 3, 2012, were Tablighis, and it is unclear what evidence the Rakhine Inquiry Commission based its report on.
But the incident reveals an element of Myanmar’s communal tensions that has to date received little attention: the growing orthodoxy of sections of Myanmar’s Muslim community, driven by the adherence to the principles of a movement known as Tablighi Jamaat.
The rise of Tablighi Jamaat in recent decades has reinforced divisions between Buddhists and Muslims, but also created new ideological fault-lines within the Muslim community.
To date the debates over Islamic practice in Myanmar have taken place mostly in private forums like mosques and hidden social media groups. In one of the few articles on the topic, U Tin Win Akbar, the president of the Federation of Workers’ Union of the Burmese Citizens in Japan, wrote in February 2014 that Muslims in Myanmar are “slowly and steadily becoming more conservative and rigid in their religious practice”.
“The new style religious leaders also imposed many kinds of religious pronouncements that made it difficult for Burmese Muslims to maintain their harmonious social relations with Burmese Buddhists,” he wrote on Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives, a project set up by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
But Tablighi leaders say their movement is peaceful and Muslims join of their own choice. Prominent Tablighi U Kyaw Nyein said the movement has many followers in Myanmar and its activities were not against the law.
“There is no reason to oppose [Tablighi Jamaat],” said Kyaw Nyein, who is a legal adviser to Jamiat Ulama-al Islam, one of the country’s leading Muslim bodies. “And we don’t insist that it’s ‘fully true’ and we never criticise any other religious sects.”
The lifestyle of the prophet
A sub-sect of the Islamic revivalist movement known as Deobandi, Tablighi Jamaat was founded in northwest India in 1926 by Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandhlawi and stresses individual faith, urging Muslims to embrace the lifestyle of the prophet Muhammad. Today it is estimated to have anywhere from 12 million to 80 million followers across 150 countries, according to the Pew Research Center. The movement is a network rather than an organisation, with no real hierarchical structure, and is peaceful and strictly apolitical.
Tablighi Jamaat has six pillars, including kalmia (belief in Allah), salah (daily prayers) and dawah (preaching the message of Allah). Male followers grow beards and wear kurtas – long, white robes for which Tablighis are easily identifiable – while women cover themselves in public and typically devote themselves to family and religious life.
The focus on dawah has prompted some to describe Tablighi as “Muslim Jehova’s Witnesses”. Typically, adherents will go on a 40-day mission, or chillah, during which they preach to other Muslims, encouraging them to attend prayers at their mosque and listen to sermons. They do not seek to convert non-Muslims.
“It’s essentially a movement for the poor. It’s a very attractive identity offer for ordinary Muslims – the strength is the openness and flexibility,” Mr Alexander Horstmann, an associate professor in Modern Southeast Asian Studies at the School of Humanities at Estonia’s Tallinn University, told Frontier.
“It’s not complicated, not bureaucratic, it’s very flexible. People are very friendly with each other, calling each other brothers and sisters, so there’s a lot of solidarity,” said Horstmann, who has taught at Mandalay University and interviewed many Muslims in Myanmar for his research.
Horstmann said that its popularity in Myanmar has in partly been built on disaffection with traditional hierarchies and leaders, and it offers Tablighis opportunities that would otherwise not be open to them.
“There’s a very clear class issue here, and also one of education,” said Horstmann. “Established Muslim elites have strong hierarchies and they have their own madrassas. They are not so open for the ordinary Muslims.
“So the Tablighi have their own welfare and education systems, and they have very strong social support structures.”
The rise of Tablighi Jamaat
Tablighi Jamaat had surfaced in Myanmar by 1960, when several well-educated Muslims initiated a campaign in an attempt to spread its teachings around the country. (Frontier approached one of the four Tablighi initiators for an interview but he declined to comment.)
This campaign was brief; the movement was forced underground by General Ne Win’s 1962 coup. But far from disappearing, during this period Tablighi followers became influential on some of the main Muslim organisations in Myanmar, including Jamiat Ulama-al Islam and the Islamic Religious Affairs Council, according to French scholar Mr François Robinne from the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS).
Local Muslims also point to the end of socialist autarky after 1988 and the gradual opening of the country by the military regime as a pivotal moment in the growth of the movement. Missionaries, including those from abroad, were able to visit and travel relatively freely, while Muslims from Myanmar travelled in the other direction. In ever-larger numbers, Muslims began travelling to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj pilgrimage and to the Tablighi headquarters near New Delhi. The return of some Myanmar Muslims from India in around 2000 has also been cited as an important development.
“People who did the Hajj saw the dressing style in Mecca and brought it back to Myanmar – it was really new for Muslims here,” said Ko Than Swe, a Muslim businessman from Mandalay. “Soon after, many shops selling Indian and Arab-style clothing opened here.”
But these new ideas and influences were arriving at a time when the military regime was creating a national identity that largely excluded Muslims. For people in search of meaning, identity and acceptance, Tablighi has proven an attractive proposition.
Tablighi Jamaat’s influence is most noticeable in Yangon. The country’s largest city and gateway to the outside world, it’s also traditionally been much more influenced by South Asian Islamic ideology. But Tablighi Jamaat is also widespread in other communities around the country. When Frontier visited the Sunni Jamaat Mosque, in Yangon’s Thingangyun Township last month, a group of Burmese Muslims from Kyaukse Township in Mandalay Region were visiting to meet Tablighi followers in Yangon.
It’s not clear how many active Tablighis there are in Myanmar; they are also difficult to count because it can be a temporary identity and adherents may be members of multiple religious groupings. Some estimate that up to half of the country’s Muslim population may be affiliated with Tablighi Jamaat in some way.
Horstmann said experienced Tablighi missionaries are constantly on the move, travelling around the countryside and abroad. They form small bands of followers, and work to establish control over mosques and conduct outreach in communities.
“Tablighi Jamaat [activists] are very diligent. They make sure they contact every [Muslim] restaurant, every shop. They talk to these people and so the question is how those people respond,” he said. “It’s a sort of mouth-to-mouth propaganda. This kind of flexibility, mobility makes them hugely influential in this minority context ... They offer social capital and religious respect, as well as opportunities for networking and access to international Muslim networks.”
‘These differences don’t make us opponents’
Prior to this year’s Thingyan water festival, some people discovered their Facebook Newsfeed contained messages urging Muslims to avoid the celebrations. A few posts seen by Frontier even warned Muslims against eating mont lone ye paw, a traditional snack, saying that it was the equivalent of eating pork.
Ko Aung Zaw Myint was one of those who helped spread the message about avoiding Thingyan. Also known as Ibrahim, he said he was simply opposed to the hedonism that is often associated with Thingyan – a sentiment that many Buddhists also share.
“During my early adulthood, I enjoyed Thingyan very much. But it has changed – there’s too much alcohol and rude conversations. People lost their mind when they were drunk and did not have a good attitude. So I avoid [participating] in Thingyan and I urge other people to do so.”
Ibrahim became a Tablighi in 2000, when he was in his first year of university. He attends the Sunni Jamaat mosque and is active in the Tablighi movement and regularly travels on missionary work.
Because Tablighi Jamaat is not an organisation, Ibrahim has no official position in the movement. But it was clear from the way that other Muslims at the mosque interacted with him that he was a figure of some authority.
Asked how he became a Tablighi, he describes it as a religious conversion, even a “miracle”. A friend persuaded him to go on a chillah with other Tablighis and while they were eating together in a mosque, he noticed he was eating with his left hand and everyone else was using their right. “It was like a light in my head went off,” he said. “I realised that I needed to change so I could be one of them. All Muslims have to be the same, to be united.”
He said the centre of the Tablighi movement is Tachanbe Mosque on Upper Pansodan Road in Yangon. “Most Tablighi Muslims go there every Tuesday and Thursday. Senior Tablighi people give some rules and regulations, instructions. The biggest day is Thursday; the meeting and discussion normally takes around three hours.”
When Tablighi missionaries visit a mosque, they invite other Muslims to come and discuss Tablighi Jamaat. “Some Indian Tablighi Muslims often come here to give sermons,” Ibrahim said.
Asked to describe the movement, he said it encourages followers of Islam to be “true Muslims”, both on the outside through their appearance and the “inside” through their adherence to Islamic teaching. “As much as they can, a Tablighi must be like the Prophet Muhammad,” he said.
He downplayed concerns about Tablighis creating divisions or making themselves targets due to their appearance, saying that not all Tablighis wore kurtas or grew beards.
“For women, the change is more than men but … I don’t think that [appearance] is a big issue. Yes, some people say we are different with others but I don’t think that these differences make us opponents or should be seen as trying to provoke each other.
“For the Muslims who are against Tablighi, we have to take time to correct them. Although we’ve been facing criticism, we need persistence.”
Frontier attempted to interview several other Tablighis but many declined to comment, citing the sensitivity of the topic.
In Mandalay, several Tablighi followers explained the movement’s principles to Frontier off the record. The movement is much less prominent in the city – it’s rare to see Tablighis in public – and those interviewed dressed like Burmese Muslims, with just a short beard and slightly longer shirt rather than the full beard and kurta. Asked about the movement, they said simply that “Tabligh is fine here”.
The Islamic Religious Affairs Council also declined to comment for this article. Kyaw Nyein said that Ulama-al Islam never sought to instruct Muslims which form of Islam to follow.
“You just practise what you believe in. We never have a low opinion upon each other [because of their beliefs]. Our religious sect Ulama-al Islam abstains from any speech or writing that might offend the beliefs of others or create misunderstanding among believers and we urge all to abstain from such acts,” he said.
Kyaw Nyein was disdainful though of those Muslims who criticise Tablighi Jamaat. “Most of the Muslim scholars – the real, competent scholars – don’t talk about it, but a group of those who get nowhere enjoy talking nonsense.”
‘People think they are foreigners’
The rise of Tablighi Jamaat has created new fault-lines within Myanmar’s Muslim community, which has traditionally been divided – in culture, language and faith – between those of Indian descent and those who identify as ethnically Burmese or Bamar.
In an echo of the way that Buddhists often view Islam, some Burmese Muslims feel that their beliefs and way of life are under threat because of the proselytising of the Tablighi Jamaat movement, which they say has resulted in many Burmese Muslims adopting Tablighi as their identity.
Writing in the 2015 book Metamorphosis: Studies in Social and Political Change in Myanmar, Robinne described the Tablighi Jamaat’s missionary work as “Islamising the Muslims of the country by ‘de-Burmanising’ them”.
But Muslim author and teacher U Aung Aung Than said Tablighi Jamaat’s growth was also fuelling tensions with non-Muslims, who viewed their conservative appearance as “very noticeable and strange”. It may even be contributing to widely held perceptions – unsubstantiated by the 2014 census – that the Muslim community is growing rapidly, or that illegal immigrants are “overrunning” the country.
When Frontier recently interviewed Burmese Muslim leaders in Mandalay, they spoke of “strange” Muslims – Tablighis – who had recently arrived in the city and settled in a particular ward.
“We can’t deny this problem. It’s happening. People [non-Muslims] think that they [Tablighis] are foreigners,” said Aung Aung Than.
He suggested that Tablighis should seek to combine the movement’s ideology with Burmese culture and traditions, to form a hybrid “Burmanised Tablighi”.
Some Muslims are even mobilising against Tablighi Jamaat, using social media to advocate a more moderate form of Islam and recalling a time when the Buddhist and Muslim communities were said to be more closely integrated.
When communal violence erupted in 2012 and stoked tensions between the religions, Ko Thet Ko Ko, 36, joined with like-minded Muslims to create a group called Yway Latyar. The group advocates maintaining Burmese culture and customs alongside the practise of Islam, and Thet Ko Ko said its aim is to promote co-existence and harmony with other ethnic and religious groups.
The name means “the chosen people”, and was used by a group of Muslim soldiers who served the Burmese kings since the Nyaung Yan period, in the 17th and 18th centuries.
“Our message is simple: that Myanmar Muslims should not stay differently and be isolated from others,” Thet Ko Ko told Frontier.
He likened some elements of Tabligh Jamaat to the conservative Buddhist 969 movement, which rose to prominence in 2012 with hardline nationalists like U Wirathu as its unofficial leaders.
“They [Tablighis] are spreading messages like, ‘Do not buy commodities and food at non-Muslims shops’, and ‘Do not wear the same clothes as [non-Muslims]’,” Thet Ko Ko said.
Despite the efforts of his group and others, Thet Ko Ko said he believed Tablighi Jamaat was winning this contest of ideas, particularly in rural areas.
“Because of Tablighi preaching, so many Muslims in remote villages and areas are starting to think that they need to be different with others,” he said.
“As the Tablighi missionaries are very strong, well-organised and well-funded by wealthy Muslim people, it’s hard to promote Myanmar traditions in the Muslim community. Because religion is a sensitive issue, we’ve also been facing lots of criticism. But we’ll try as much as we can to stay in harmony.”
Ko Kyaw Zin Lat, a young Muslim lawyer and former Tablighi, said he was concerned that in the context of rising Buddhist nationalism the movement’s activities could “provoke” conflict.
He suggested that leaders set clearer guidelines on Tablighi activities, particularly missionary work. In Sri Lanka, he said, Tablighis are given training before they go on a chillah, but that this does not seem to be the case in Myanmar.
He said he was pressured by others at his mosque to become a Tablighi. Although he accepted the six pillars, he left the movement because he was uncomfortable wearing a kurta in public.
“Some [Tablighi] leaders don’t restrict [their followers] tightly, but some use force [to wear a kurta],” he said.
Military green light
That Tablighi Jamaat was able to thrive under military rule is curious. Foreign missionaries came and went relatively freely, and by the mid to late 2000s, Tablighis were holding large public preaching ceremonies in Yangon with several thousand participants.
This has fed some conspiracy theories that the military encouraged the growth of the movement in order to fan the flames of communal tension.
Thet Ko Ko from Yway Latyar said that when the military government allowed Tablighi events, “we young Muslims were not allowed to organise some interfaith discussions”.
Kyaw Zin Lat said Tablighi leaders reported their activities regularly to the Department of Religious Affairs, but he still found it hard to understand why the military regime allowed Tablighi to conduct missionary work openly.
“This was a time when the military regime made gatherings of five or more people illegal,” he said. “Even Buddhists monks couldn’t give a public sermon, but those Tablighis were allowed to gather in large numbers. I just wonder why the generals, who hate Muslims, didn’t stop their activities.”
But Horstmann said a more likely scenario was that the military understood the movement was peaceful, and there was a consensus that Tablighis could conduct their missionary works within certain boundaries.
“I think the military understood that there’s not really a threat coming from the Tablighi,” he said. “They understand that it’s a peaceful movement and it’s actually very different to the radicalisation taking place elsewhere [around the world].”
Ibrahim said that several government informants attended his mosque to listen to the sermons and report back to their superiors.
“When the Tablighi programs ‘opened’, many Muslims would come to join us. The intelligence forces came into the mosque and listened to what our leaders said. We all know that, but later they realised that we are not really concerned with politics.”
Kyaw Nyein from Ulama-al Islam gave a similar explanation. He said some groups had tried to stop the Tablighi Jamaat activities during the socialist era, but later Tablighi leaders explained their beliefs and the government approved their activities.
Beginning the discussion
Although peaceful and non-political, Tablighi Jamaat’s success at encouraging Muslims to embrace a fundamentalist version of Islam, particularly in their appearance, has reinforced divisions between Buddhists and Muslims at a time when many Buddhists are anxious about the future of their race and religion.
But Tablighi Jamaat does not explain the discrimination against Muslims or the attacks that have taken place since 2012, much less justify them. Muslims who follow Tablighi Jamaat are simply exercising their legal rights, and they are doing so peacefully and without disturbing others.
It’s important to note that Tablighi Jamaat is not new. If it has now become a source of communal tension, it is because political and social dynamics in Myanmar have shifted, particularly since the transition began in 2011.
Horstmann said he believed Tablighi Jamaat had been influential since the early 1990s “at the latest”. “What is new are the anxieties from Buddhists, they are really big, and they have been amplified by the constant hate speech by some Buddhist monks.”
While dialogue and understanding are needed to overcome these tensions, beginning the conversation is difficult. Kyaw Zin Lat said because the Muslim community feels under threat, a culture has developed where dissent or disagreement is seen as dangerous – much as it was in the pro-democracy movement under military rule.
As a result, it is hard for discussions around identity and belief to take place openly between Muslims, let alone with other religious groups.
“If some people criticise some wrong doings [that Muslims are doing], the Muslims leaders blame them. They say, ‘Don’t you understand? We have to be united in this situation’,” Kyaw Zin Lat said. “This is a big problem in the community, because it creates a society where people just believe whatever the leader says.”
Tablighi Jamaat raises important questions about Myanmar’s past, present and future. The conversation, though, is yet to begin.
YEAR-WISE DEVELOPMENTS
1926, 1995, 2018
MUMBAI: Tablighi Jamaat, the Islamic revivalist missionary movement, headquartered at Nizamuddin in Delhi, split into two factions two years ago following a dispute over the running of the organization. While the bigger faction is headquartered at Banglewali Masjid in Nizamuddin, the breakaway faction runs from a mosque in Nerul near Mumbai.
Founded by Maulana Mohammed Ilyas in 1926, the global Tablighi movement ran smoothly till Maulana Inamul Hasan was its Amir or head. Hasan, in his lifetime, set up a Shura or apex consultation body, for major decisions in the Jamaat. After Hasan’s death in 1995, his son Maulana Zubairul Hasan and another senior Tablighi member, Maulana Saad, co-led the Shura. After Maulana Zubairul Hasan died in March 2014, Maulana Saad became its sole head.
“After this, there were allegations of Maulana Saad taking decision arbitrarily which angered some senior members in the organization,” said a Mumbai-based cleric who has observed the Tablighi activities for years.
Two years ago, the differences led to a rift in the Tablighi movement dividing it into two factions. While Maulana Saad continued to head the main faction headquartered at Nizamuddin, the breakaway unit is being run by Maulana Ahmed Lad and Ibrahim Deola from a mosque at Nerul near Mumbai.
Different cities have zonal Markaz or centres which identify mosques to facilitate the stay of visiting Jamaats or groups. Normally a visiting group stays at a mosque for three days before they leave for the next destination or mosque. Mumbai has four centres located at four different mosques (Chuna Bhatti, Khar, Jogeshwari and Kurla Pipe Road). After clashes were reported at some mosques in Mumbai two years ago, the two factions began to take greater care in keeping their members away from each other to avoid clashes.
