Revision as of 06:04, 2 December 2018

In brief

The Mumbai attacks, November 26-28, 2008- places, dates and deaths
From: November 26, 2017: The Times of India

The Mumbai attacks, November 26-28, 2008- The main accused
From: November 26, 2017: The Times of India

India Today, December 29, 2008

See graphics:

The Mumbai attacks, November 26-28, 2008- places, dates and deaths

'The Mumbai attacks, November 26-28, 2008- The main accused

India’s 9/11

Mumbai attacked, 2008

The 59-hour-long televised tableau of terror that unfolded in Mumbai on November 26 and numbed the nation was the new benchmark for terror as well as for the in-built sloth in India’s intelligence and security setups. The audacious attack, simultaneously carried out at 11 places in India’s financial capital, by a group of 10 armed terrorists, came from the Arabian Sea. “Indian citizens are condemned to be the permanent victims of jihad and a political class which has no sense of the nation,” said India Today in its December 2008 issue.

Ten key points

What happened on 26/11?: 10 key points, 26 Nov, 2016, The Times of India/ Agencies

On November 26, 2008, Mumbai fell victim to one of the worst terrorist attacks in Indian history. Its perpetrators, members of the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, terrorized Maximum City for three days, targeting some of its most best-known locations and killing up to 166 people.

On the eighth anniversary of the attacks, here's a short guide to the events that unfolded on November 26 and the days that followed.

1. A three-day onslaught

In a three-day onslaught that began on November 26, 2008, 10 terrorists targeted several high-profile locations in Mumbai, including the landmark Taj Hotel at the Gateway, the Oberoi Trident at Nariman Point, Leopold Café, and Chhatrapati Shiva ji Terminus - killing up to 166 people, and leaving 300 injured. Up to 26 foreign nationals were among those killed by the terrorists.

2. From Karachi to Mumbai

The terrorists, arrived in Mumbai on the night of November 26, after travelling from Karachi by sea. All of them, save one - Ajmal Kasab, - were eventually killed in counter-terror operations.

3. Kasab hanged

Kasab, captured alive, was sentenced to death by a special anti-terror court in May 2010, and hanged at the Yerawada central prison in Pune in November 2012.

4. The martyrs of 26/11

Up to 18 security personnel were martyred in the attack. Among them were Mumbai Anti-Terrorist squad chief Hemant Karkare, Army Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan, Mumbai's Additional Police Commissioner Ashok Kamte, Senior Police Inspector Vijay Salaskar, and assistant sub-inspector Tukaram Gopal Omble.

5. Omble's valour

It was Omble's supreme sacrifice that made the capture of Ajmal Kasab possible. On the night of November 26 near Girgaum Chowpatty, he grabbed the barrel of Kasab's assault rifle, and - when the terrorist began shooting him - didn't let go of him, providing his team-mates with the perfect cover and preventing Kasab from harming anyone else.

6. The 26/11 attacks case in Pakistan

Lashkar-e-Taiba operations commander Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi stands accused - along with six others - of abetment to murder, attempted murder, and planning and executing the Mumbai attack, in a case that has been drawn out for more than six years in Pakistan. Another accused, former LeT member Sufayan Zafar - who was arrested on charges that he financed the Mumbai attacks - was recently absolved by Pakistan's Federal Investigative Agency.

7. India suggests ways to expedite trial

India wrote to Pakistan in September to suggest ways in which the trial in the 26/11 terrorist attacks case could be expedited, Ministry of External Affairs Spokesperson Vikas Swarup said. The prosecution in the trial, on its part, said in October that India hadn't responded to Pakistan's request that it send 24 witnesses in the case to testify in court, and that the case couldn't move forward until India did so.

8. The case goes on

The seven people accused of planning and executing the Mumbai attacks - including Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi - in September challenged the legality of a Pakistani judicial commission which went to India in 2013 to probe the attacks. Lakhvi was released from prison on bail last year, while the other six accused are in Rawalpindi's Adaila Jail.

9. Hafiz Saeed's role

Hafiz Saeed, founder of the terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the chief of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (or JuD, a charity organisation considered to be a cover for the LeT), is another key mastermind of the attack.

10. JuD banned in Pakistan; Saeed put under house arrest, then released

The United Nations Security Council banned the JuD after the Mumbai attacks. Pakistan, too, gave in to international pressure and banned the JuD, and placed Hafiz Saeed under house arrest for months, but ended up letting him go. He now lives as a free citizen in Lahore, and India's demands that he be brought to book have been met with the response that Pakistan doesn't have the evidence it needs to prosecute him.

Highlights

Oneindia

Oneindia | 26th Nov, 2015 11:12 AM

On Nov 26 2008 a group of 10 terrorists associated with Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT) attacked India's financial capital Mumbai. It left India, and the world, shocked by the audacity of the attack.

The terrorists who took part in the 2008 Mumbai attacks arrived by sea rout to reach their destination to create horror among people of Mumbai. They were highly trained and were preparing for this strike for quite a long time.

The 10 terrorists from Pakistan created havoc in Mumbai with more than 10 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks on hotels, a train station, a hospital and a Jewish community centre over three days.

Here are some facts you need to know about 26/11 attacks

1. Ten terrorists from Karachi took sea route to land in Mumbai in 2008.

2. The deadliest terror attacks carried out on Indian soil started on 26 November (Wednesday) and lasted until Saturday, 29 November 2008.

3. The multiple attacks and the counter -terrorist offensive lasted over 60 hours.

4. Attacks were carried out by terrorists at Railway station, Leopold Cafe, Taj Mahal Palace & Tower Hotel, Oberoi Trident Hotel, Metro Cinema, Cama and Albless Hospital and Nariman House.

5. The terrorists used automatic weapons and grenades in the attacks.

6. During the three-day assault on the city more than 160 people including foreign nationals were killed and 308 people injured in the deadliest attacks carried out on Indian soil.

7. Apart from attacks at various locations, two taxis were also exploded in the city the same evening by the use of time bombs.

8. Nine of the gunmen were killed during the attacks, one survived. Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving gunman, was executed in India in November 2012 in Yerwada jail, Pune.

9. National Security Guards (NSG) conducted 'Operation Black Tornado' to flush out the terrorists.

10. Hafiz Saeed, leader of Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JuD) is said to be the alleged master mind behind the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Hafiz Saeed who operated mainly from Pakistan planned and executed the entire 26/11 Mumbai attack plan.

Source: www.oneindia.com

A timeline of events

The Hindu, September 30, 2015

11 July, 2006

Seven RDX bombs rip the first class compartments of Mumbai local trains between Churchgate and Bhayander station in a span of 11 minutes. 189 dead, around 800 injured

21 July, 2006

Police arrest three persons in connection with the blasts.

30 November, 2006

ATS files charge sheet, 13 arrested accused and 15 absconding accused charged under MCOCA

21 June, 2007

7/11 accused move Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of MCOCA. In February 2008, Supreme Court ordered a stay on the trial.

23 September, 2008

Mumbai Crime Branch arrests five IM operatives. Crime branch probe shows IM carried out the bombings, contradicting ATS that Pakistani nationals also planted bombs.

13 February, 2010

Young lawyer Shahid Azmi, who defended some of the accused in 7/11 case, shot dead in his central Mumbai office.

23 April, 2010

Stay on trial vacated, examination of witnesses resume

23 June, 2010

Media barred from entering court conducting trial

30 August, 2013

Yasin Bhatkal, co-founder of IM, arrested at Indo-Nepal border. Yasin claims the 2006 bombings were done by IM in retaliation to the 2002 riots, raising questions about arrest of 13 accused by ATS

20 August, 2014

7/11 trial concludes and court reserves judgment

11 September, 2015

MCOCA court convicts 12 of the 13 arrested accused in the case.

30 September, 2015

MCOCA court sentences five convicts to death. Seven get life imprisonment.

How the terror attack unfolded

November 26, 2018: The Times of India

It's been a decade since the deadly terror attacks took place in Mumbai, claiming the lives of as many as 165 and leaving over 300 injured. Ten years on, the feelings of anger, helplessness and deep sense of loss and pain still exists among those who were witness to this act of horror. Here's a look at how this gruesome attack unfolded.

Policemen were afraid, let Kasab flee railway station

Cops were afraid, let Ajmal Kasab flee from railway station: Mediaperson, November 25, 2018: The Times of India

The photojournalist who captured the chilling image of 26/11 Mumbai attack terrorist Ajmal Kasab at the Chhatrapati Shiva-ji Maharaj Terminus, says police let Kasab and his accomplice flee from the railway station.

On November 26, 2008, Sebastian D'Souza ran out from his office next to the train station armed with nothing more than his Nikon camera and lenses, after hearing the gunfire.

The photo and testimony of 'Saby', as he is known in media circles, was to play a crucial role in the 26/11 trial, which led to Kasab's hanging in 2012.

"Had policemen posted near the railway station killed Kasab and the other terrorist inside the station, so many lives could have been saved," Saby told .

In one of the most horrific terrorist attacks on the soil of India, 166 people were killed and over 300 were injured when ten heavily-armed terrorists from Pakistan ran a rampage in Mumbai 10 years ago.

"There were two police battalions present near the station, but did nothing," said Saby, who retired in 2012 and settled in Goa.

Saby, 67, won the World Press Photo award for the close-up photograph of Kasab, holding an AK-47.

He took the photos using a telephoto lens on his Nikon camera, while hiding inside a train carriage.

"I ran into the first carriage of one of the trains on the platform to try and get a shot, but as I could not get a good angle, moved to the second carriage and waited for the terrorists to walk by. I briefly had time to take a couple of frames. I think they saw me taking photographs, but didn't seem to care," he said.

Having given up photography after retirement, Saby now keep himself busy with carpentry and paintings.

"I don't want to remember what I did that (November 26) night," he said, terming the sequence of events as an 'old film' which he wants to erase from his memory.

Kasab was grinning while firing

10 years of 26/11 attacks: Kasab was 'grinning' while firing at commuters, recalls Railway announcer, November 25, 2018: The Times of India

Ten years after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, terrorist Mohammad Ajmal Kasab's grin is still etched in Vishnu Zende's memory.

The railway announcer's presence of mind saved the lives of hundreds of commuters at the Chhatrapati Shiva-ji Maharaj Terminus here that fateful night.

"I remember the evil grin on Kasab's face. Armed with an assault rifle, he was walking towards the suburban platform," he said.

Zende, 47, vividly recalls Kasab "grinning and abusing people" while spraying bullets from his assault rifle as the biggest ever terror attack on India unfolded on November 26, 2008.

Now working as a guard in the Central Railway, Zende says he is unable to forget the terror attack and the "barbaric" way in which the terrorist went about slaying people.

Of the 166 killed in the 26/11 attack, 52 died at the railway station. As many as 108 were injured in the firing at the station.

"While firing indiscriminately, Kasab also waved his hand at us, signalling that we (railway staff) come out of the control room," Zende said.

The terrorist was mercilessly firing at people who were running to save their lives, he said. "When Kasab found nobody to kill at the platform, he also fired at a dog, he added.

"After hearing a loud sound on the long-distance train platform, I first thought it was a blast and started announcing that people should not go near the blast site. I also requested railway police to rush to the site," he said.

As soon as Zende made the announcement, he saw Kasab and a second terrorist coming towards the suburban trains' platform. "That was the moment I realised it was a terror arrack," he said.

"I had to alert commuters about the terrorists and started announcing about the attack. I told people to vacate the station immediately," he said.

Zende asked passengers to leave the station from the rear end of Platform No. 1 as he felt it was a relatively safe place at that time.

The railway staffer who also deposed as a witness in the 26/11 case, said, "I saw two faces of Kasab: one with the evil grin during the firing and a dispassionate one, bereft on any emotion, inside the courtroom".

Police was unaware of Chabad House

Bharti Jain, As 26/11 unfolded, Mumbai Police were unaware of Chabad House’s existence, November 26, 2018: The Times of India

Among the iconic targets of the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai — Taj Mahal Hotel, CST and Leopold Cafe — there was one that the local police did not even know existed. When the ministry of external affairs, alerted by Israelis of a terror situation unfolding on November 26, 2008, against Jews residing in Colaba, first reached out to Mumbai Police, the latter’s initial response was that there wasn’t any Jewish centre in the area.

Mumbai Police was then grappling with the sheer magnitude of the multi-target attacks, with all its resources on the ground. The call for help by an MEA official, which came amid a sea of rescue calls from affected citizens and VIPs, did not quite set alarm bells ringing. With the local police station and even officials of the special branch’s foreigners division unaware of a Chabad House in Nariman House at Colaba, all the police promised was to check and revert.

Meanwhile, an Israeli diplomat had reached Colaba police station to report the attack on Jewish settlement in the area. The control room, which first got the message of firing in Colaba Wadi at 2217 hours, had no idea it was taking place at Nariman House. A senior special branch officer present at Colaba police station decided to head to Taj instead. Central intelligence agencies meanwhile also asked Mumbai police to check on the attack on Jews reported by Israeli embassy through MEA.

Finally, it was ACP Issaq Ibrahim Bagwan who decided to move from Leopold Cafe to Colaba Market upon hearing a loud explosion from that side. Even he could not locate the target building since not many in the locality knew the significance of Nariman House. It was only after he reached the spot that he learnt that Jews living there were under fire and in a hostage situation. He called for reinforcements, cordoned off the area and got people vacated from surrounding buildings.

The policemen started shooting at terrorists present in Nariman House from nearby buildings. On the morning of November 27, Moshe, the toddler child of the rabbi held hostage there, and his nanny Sandra Samuels came out. The gunfight between Mumbai police and terrorists went on till NSG came in on November 27 afternoon. Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg and his pregnant wife Rivka were among the five Israeli hostages killed.

Interestingly, three intelligence alerts were shared with Mumbai police before 26/11 about possible attacks on Jewish targets. However, Nariman House was not identified as a target. As per Ram Pradhan committee which probed lapses behind 26/11, the threat could have been better handled but “none in Colaba police station or for that matter SB (special branch) knew about the existence of a Jewish settlement in Nariman House”.

After the 26/11 attacks, the government got Israeli authorities to share a complete list of Chabad Houses and Jewish centres across India. Requisite security arrangements were put in place.

An analysis

The Hindu, September 30, 2015

The mangled first class compartment of an EMU train at Matunga station on July 11, 2006. Starting 6.24 p.m. that day, seven blasts ripped through the first class compartments of local trains at Matunga, Mahim, Bandra, Jogeshwari, Borivali and Mira Road stations. Photo: Vivek Bendre

The Hindu The mangled first class compartment of an EMU train at Matunga station on July 11, 2006. Starting 6.24 p.m. that day, seven blasts ripped through the first class compartments of local trains at Matunga, Mahim, Bandra, Jogeshwari, Borivali and Mira Road stations. Photo: Vivek Bendre

Seven serial blasts ripped through Mumbai's suburban railway network at peak hour on July 11, 2006, leaving 180 dead and several injured.

Seven serial blasts ripped through Mumbai's suburban railway network at peak hour on July 11, 2006, leaving at least 147 dead and several injured. The death toll rose to 189 later.

The blasts began shortly after 6.20 p.m. when a First Class compartment in a Western Railway suburban train running from Churchgate to Borivali exploded between Khar and Santa Cruz stations. In the next ten minutes, six more explosions occured in Bandra-Khar Road, Jogeshwari-Mahim Junction, Mira Road- Bhayander, Matunga- Mahim Junction and Borivali.

Pressure cookers were used in blasts: police

Packed with RDX and ammonium nitrate, they were taken in carry bags to the Churchgate station.

The accused and their roles

The Hindu, September 30, 2015

Source: ATS charge sheet

Faisal Shaikh, Mumbai chief, Lashkar-e-Taiba

-Worked for Azam Cheema, LeT commander in chief, training in Pakistan

-Received arms training in Pakistan.

-On Cheema's orders, Shaikh sent his brother Muzammil, Dr Tanvir

Ansari, Sohail Shaikh, Zameer Shaikh to Pakistan via Tehran

-Helped in getting hawala money for the execution of the 7/11 blasts through absconding accused Rizwan Daware and his brother, Rahil.

-Key conspirator along with Asif Khan Bashir Khan

-Housed and harboured Pakistani terrorists Salim, Sohail Shaikh, Abdul

Razak, Abu Umed at his residence

-7/11 conspiracy meetings were held at his Bandra residence

-Helped in assembling bombs in Mohammed Ali's house

-Planted the bomb which exploded at Jogeshwari station

Asif Khan Bashir Khan alias Junaid, key conspirator

-Housed and harboured Pakistani terrorists at his Mira Road residence

-Procured rexine bags, utensils, ammonium nitrate, detonators

-Helped in assembling bombs in Mohammed Ali's house

-Planted the bomb which exploded in Borivali station

Mohammed ALI, activist, SIMI

-Received arms training in Pakistan

-Bombs were assembled at his residence

-Attended 7/11 conspiracy meetings

Majid Mohammed Shafi, Resident, Kolkata

-Helped Pakistani terrorists Sabir, Abu Bakr, Kasam Ali, Ammu Jan,

Ehsanullah, Abu Hasan cross into India through Indo-Bangladesh border

-Ehsanullah brought RDX with him, which were later used in making bombs

Sajid Margub Ansari, activist, SIMI

-Procured timer electric circuitry and other devices for 7/11

-Housed and harboured Pakistani terrorists Aslam and Haifzulla

-Helped in assembling bombs at Mohammed Ali's house

-Attended 7/11 conspiracy meetings

Kamal Ansari, resident, Madhubani

-Received arms training in Pakistan

-Helped Pakistani terrorists Aslam and Hafizullah cross into India through Indo-Nepal border

Ehteshaam Siddiqui, Mumbai secretary, SIMI

-Harboured Pakistani terrorists Ammu Jan, Sabir, Abu Bakr, Kasam Ali, Ehsahnullah, Abu Hasan in a Mumbra house rented by Abdul Wahid Din Shaikh

-Surveyed local trains to plan the blasts

-Helped in assembling bombs in Mohammed Ali's house

-Attended 7/11 conspiracy meetings

-Planted the bomb which exploded at Mira Road station

Zameer Shaikh, activist, SIMI

-Received arms training in Pakistan

-Surveyed local trains to plan the blasts

-Attended 7/11 conspiracy meetings

Muzammil Shaikh, Faisal's brother

-This computer engineer received arms training in Pakistan

-Surveyed local trains to plan the blasts

-Helped in procuring hawala money to execute the 7/11 conspiracy through absconding accused Rizwan Daware and his brother Rahil

-Attended 7/11 conspiracy meetings

Sohail Shaikh, activist, SIMI

-Received arms and ammunition training in Pakistan

-Surveyed local trains to plan the blasts

-Attended 7/11 conspiracy meetings

Dr Tanvir Ansari, activist, SIMI

-Received arms training in Pakistan

-Surveyed local trains to plan the blasts

-Helped in assembling bombs in Mohammed Ali's house

-Attended 7/11 conspiracy meetings

Naveed Hussain, Call centre employee from Hyderabad, Faisal's friend

-Helped in assembling bombs in Mohammed Ali's house

-Attended 7/11 conspiracy meetings

-Planted the bomb which exploded at Bandra station.

Abdul Wahid Din Shaikh, activist, SIMI

-Pakistani terrorists Ammu Jan, Sabir, Abu Bakr, Kasam Ali, Ehsahnullah and Abu Hasan lived in a Mumbra house rented by him

David Headley and his role

AMERICA SACRIFICED MUMBAI TO KEEP HEADLEY IN PLAY

Indian intelligence agents did have a showdown with the US but the CIA blamed attack on India’s incompetence, say two investigative journalists

Adrian Levy & Cathy Scott-Clark

The Times of India

David Headley: double-agent, mastermind

A valued CIA proxy, who infiltrated the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), a banned Pakistani Islamist outfit, planned the Mumbai attacks in which 166 people were killed, and more than 300 injured. David Headley, an American citizen, conceived, scoped and ran supplies for the terrorist ‘swarm’ operation, so called because several independent units simultaneously hit their enemy in multiple locations, coming out of nowhere, multiplying fear and panic.

Headley selected Mumbai, India’s commercial capital, as the theatre of operations while acting as a ‘prized counter-terrorism asset’ for the United States, according to senior officers in the Joint Terrorism Task Force, who described his covert career as running for eleven years. When the LeT’s ten-man suicide squad sailed from a creek in Pakistan’s southern port city of Karachi, at dawn on 22 November 2008, they navigated towards a landing spot in Mumbai, marked on a GPS provided by the Washington DCborn maverick. Reaching the world’s fourth largest metropolis four nights later, LeT’s team fanned out, following routes plotted by Headley over an intense two-year period of surveillance. Shortly before 10pm, the gunmen shot dead tourists at the Leopold Café, massacred more than 60 Indian commuters at the Chhatrapati Shiva ji Terminus (CST) railway station, and then laid siege to a Jewish centre and two five-star hotels, including the luxurious Taj Mahal Palace, Mumbai’s most famous landmark. Ten men would keep the mega-city burning for more than three days.

CIA tips

The most complete survey to date of former and serving intelligence agents, diplomats, police, and survivors from 12 countries, reveals that the CIA repeatedly tipped off their counterparts in India to an imminent attack, using intelligence derived from their prize asset Headley. What they did not reveal was that their source, a public school educated Pakistani-American dilettante and entrepreneur, was allowed to remain in place even as the attack was realized. His continuing proximity to the terrorist outfit would eventually lead to a showdown between Washington and New Delhi.

Researching ‘The Siege’, we learned that Indian intelligence agents accused their US counterparts of protecting Headley and leaving him in the field, despite the imminent threat to Mumbai. Irate Indian officials claimed that Headley’s Mumbai plot was allowed to run on by his US controllers, as to spool it in would have jeopardized his involvement in another critical US operation. Having infiltrated the LeT, Headley also won access to al-Qaida, making him the only US citizen in the field who might be able to reach Osama bin Laden. Three years before America’s most wanted terrorist was finally run to ground in Abbottabad, this was an opportunity that some in the US intelligence community were not willing to give up.

Phone and email intercepts seen by us confirm how Headley had become trusted by Ilyas Kashmiri, a former LeT commander and senior al-Qaida operative, who led an al-Qaida military affiliate, known as Brigade 313. Based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, Ilyas Kashmiri was, at one point, considered as a potential successor to Osama bin Laden until his death in June 2011.

In 2009, several months after the Mumbai atrocity, agents from the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), India’s foreign intelligence agency, confronted the CIA with these claims, according to accounts seen by us. India is said to have accused the US of pursuing ‘a narrow self-interest’ and having some responsibility in the deaths in Mumbai.

However, the CIA stood firm, one senior agent claiming that ‘Indian incompetence’ was to blame for the attack. In 2006, the US had warned India that the LeT was forming a suicide squad to attack India from the sea. More than 25 increasingly detailed bulletins followed that named Mumbai as the prime objective, and identified several targets, including the Taj hotel. Additional bulletins suggested that a team of highly trained gunmen using AK47s and RDX, military-grade explosives, would seek to prolong the attack by taking hostages and establishing a stronghold, before a final shoot-out that they hoped would be broadcast live around the world on TV.

Some of these bulletins were eventually distilled into notices that reached the police patrolling Mumbai. However, the assessments were ‘ignored or downplayed’ until July 2008 when a senior police officer, a Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) with responsibility for security in the district of South Mumbai where the Taj was located, took action. On 12 August 2008, DCP Vishwas Nangre Patil spent nine hours with the Taj’s security staff, writing a report to his seniors that concluded: ‘Overall, the [Taj] management has done very little to adapt the hotel to the changing security environment in the city.’ When a truck bomb devastated the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, Pakistan, on 20 September 2008, Patil drew up an urgent list of enhanced security measures for the Taj, including snipers on the roof, blast barriers on the driveway and armed guards on all doors. Although security was tightened as a result, most of these measures were withdrawn again after DCP Patil went on leave in the second week of October 2008.

David Headley: the person

David Headley was a bizarre mix of Eastern and Western cultures and made for a near-perfect mole. His mother was Serrill Headley, a socialite and adventuress from Maryland, whose great-aunt had funded women’s rights and Albert Einstein’s research. His father was Syed Gilani, a renowned radio broadcaster and diplomat from Lahore, who had been seconded to Voice of America. When Headley was born in Washington DC in 1960, he was initially named Daood Saleem Gilani. Within a year, the family had relocated to Pakistan, where Gilani was brought up as a Muslim and schooled at an exclusive military academy. After his parents divorced and Serrill returned to the US to open a bar in Philadelphia, named, suitably, the Khyber Pass, Gilani, aged 17, rejoined her. He lived with her in a flat above the Khyber Pass — and soon immersed himself in the American way of life. Later he moved to the Upper West Side in New York, where he opened a video rental shop, Fliks.

By 1984, Gilani was a six-foot-two American boy, with a fair complexion, broad shoulders and an impressive mop of curly blond hair. Only his distinctively mismatched eyes — one blue one brown —hinted at his mixed heritage and muddled ancestry. Dressed in crumpled Armani jeans, a leather jacket slung over his shoulder, and a £10,000 Rolex Submariner poking out of his cuff, he was already looking for more lucrative opportunities than video rental. That year, he used his dual identities to smuggle half a kilogram of heroin from Pakistan’s tribal areas to New York, selling it through the video store.

When German customs officers caught him four years later at Frankfurt airport en-route to Philadelphia, with two kilograms of heroin, Gilani informed on his co-conspirators to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). While, his accomplices were jailed for between eight and ten years, he became a paid DEA informer, infiltrating Pakistan’s drug syndicates. Some US agents warned that Gilani was too volatile to be trusted, and in 1997, he was arrested again in New York for trafficking. He offered another deal, suggesting he infiltrate Islamist radicals who were starting to worry the CIA and FBI.

A letter put before the court reveals prosecutors conceded that while Gilani might have supplied up to fifteen kilograms of heroin worth £947,000, he had also been ‘reliable and forthcoming’ with the agency about ‘a range of issues’. Sentenced to fifteen months in the low-security Fort Dix prison, New Jersey, while his co-conspirator received four years in a high-security jail, he was freed after only nine months. In August 1999, one year after hundreds had been killed in simultaneous Al-Qaeda bomb attacks on American embassies in Africa, he returned to Pakistan, his ticket paid for by the US government.

By 2006, Daood had joined the inner circle of Lashkar-e-Toiba, which had been proscribed by the UN five years earlier. Coming up with the plan to attack Mumbai and launch LeT onto the international stage, he changed his name to David Headley and applied for a new US passport. He would use it to travel incognito to India on seven surveillance trips, selecting targets in Mumbai which he photographed using a camera he borrowed from his mother-in-law.

Headley was chaotic and his Mumbai plan was almost undermined by his private life. By 2008, he was married to three women, none of who knew of the others’ existence, two living apart in Pakistan and one in New York. The wife in the US, however, grew suspicious after he championed the 9/11 attackers, reporting him to the authorities. Shortly before the Mumbai operation, his cousin Alex Headley, a soldier in the US Army also considered reporting him after Headley announced that he was naming his newborn son Osama and described him as ‘my little terrorist’. His Pakistani half-brother Danyal Gilani, who worked as a press officer for the Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, disowned him.

Eventually, Headley’s mother informed on him to the FBI. Her son was only ever interested in himself, she warned, arguing that his selfishness was born out of his lack of a sense of self. None of the complainants heard anything back, with Serrill Headley, who died ten months before Mumbai, confiding in a friend that her son ‘must have worked for the US government’.

Five years on, with American officials continuing to remain silent over Headley (and the conflict of interest that enabled him to run amok in the field), and with New Delhi still prevented from accessing him, the full truth about Washington’s culpability in 26/11 remains muddied. In India, where no postmortem of any depth has been carried out into Mumbai, the scale of the intelligence failings — the inability of IB and RAW to develop the leads passed them by the CIA and others — will also never be fully exposed.

Levy and Scott-Clark are investigative journalists and authors of ‘The Siege’

The case since 2009

Some facts about the attack, The Times of India

The Times of India

Omer Farooq Khan, Dec 19 2014

Lakhvi Gets Bail For 'Lack Of Evidence' A day after Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the country's political leadership vowed to fight the last terrorist standing, a Rawalpindi anti-terrorism court on Thursday granted bail to Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi, the key handler in the 2611 Mumbai attacks case, causing outrage in India. Lakhvi, 54, and six others had filed bail applications on Wednesday in midst of a lawyers' strike called to condemn the Peshawar school massacre that left 148 people, including 132 children, dead.

Lakhvi's bail comes a day after India expressed full solidarity with Pakistan in the aftermath of the Peshawar massacre, and the court order led New Delhi to react strongly against the bail. The court said the charge-sheet against Lakhvi and other accused was flawed and lacking in evidence. The prosecutor said the government would appeal against the court's bail order. Sources said the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which had provided solid evidence to the court about LeT's involvement in the Mumbai attacks, disagreed with the bail but had to accept the court order.

The court directed Lakhvi, a trusted lieutenant of Ja maat-ud-Dawa chief Hafiz Saeed, to pay surety bonds worth Rs 5,00,000 ($5,000). “We were not expecting this decision as we were still to produce a good number of witnesses in the case,“ said chief prosecutor Chaudhry Azhar. Operations commander of the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba, the parent organization of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi is one of the seven accused of planning, financing and executing the 2611 Mumbai carnage that killed 166 people. Six other accused are Hammad Amin Sadiq, Shahid Jamil Riaz, Younas Anjum, Jamil Ahmed, Mazhar Iqbal and Abdul Majid.

He and many of his associates were arrested from LeT's headquarters in Muzaffarabad in December 2008 and the case against them registered in February 2009. Since then, the case had been moving at a snail's pace with almost negligible headway .

Following the confession of Ajmal Kasab, the lone fidayeen survivor of the Mumbai attack, naming Lakhvi as his trainer, Syed Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Jandal, an Indian national who was arrested in and deported from Saudi Arabia in June 2012, too confessed he was in the control room with Lakhvi in Karachi monitoring the Mumbai attacks. Pakistani-American jihadi David Headley too had confessed to Lakhvi's key role in the Mumbai attacks.

Earlier, the FIA, which had investigated the Mumbai attacks case, had told the court that those who killed over 166 people in Mumbai belonged to the LeT and had been trained in Pakistan.

Lakhvi's counsel Raja Rizwan Abbasi told agencies that the court had granted bail as “evidence against Lakhvi was deficient“.

He said the defence would soon file bail applications of the other six accused. The incamera hearing of the case was held at Adiala Jail Rawalpindi due to security concerns. The judge adjourned the hearing till January 7.

In February 2009 interior minister Rehman Malik had said Lakhvi was in custody and under investigation as the “foremost mastermind” behind the Mumbai attacks.

Pakistan’s support to terrorism

Levish treatment with Lakhvi in jail

An injustice to 26/11 victims.

The Times of India

Deeptiman Tiwary, December 19, 2014

The Indian security establishment is livid at 26/11plotter and LeT mastermind Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi being granted bail by a Pakistani court for “lack of evidence”. Coming as it does just a day after Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif ’s statement in the aftermath of the Peshwar attack that he would wage a war against terrorism “until not a single terrorist is left, Indian security experts say it only shows that the more Pakistan promises to change, the more it remains the same. “If Pakistan wants to say there is not enough evidence against Lakhvi, it is only trying to brazen out of the responsibility of bringing perpetrators of 2611 attacks. Not only has it been sent enough forensic evidence, even David Coleman Headley’s testimony has indicted him. But then it comes as no surprise as Lakhvi was allowed to operate freely and engage with LeT activities from within jail. Hafiz Saeed keeps roaming freely and holding public meetings,” said a senior officer.

Experts argue to expect any incident would change Pakistan’s strategy towards India or Afghanistan is being naïve. Ajai Sahni of Institute of Conflict Management says through release of Lakhvi, Pakistan has made it clear that it is only worried about domestic terrorism and not about what it’s exporting to India and Afghanistan.

View of ex-Pakistan NSA Mahmud Ali Durrani

Mumbai terror attacks carried out by group based in Pakistan: EX-Pakistan NSA, March 6, 2017: The Times of India

HIGHLIGHTS

The 26/11 attack is a classic trans-border terrorist event: Mahmud Ali Durrani

Hafiz Saeed has no utility, we should act against him

NEW DELHI: Former Pakistan National Security Adviser Mahmud Ali Durrani has admitted that 2008 Mumbai terror attacks+ were carried out by a terror group based in Pakistan. At the same time, Durrani, however, said the Pakistani government had no role in the Mumbai attacks. Durrani was speaking at a conference on combating terrorism at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis in Delhi. "26/11 Mumbai strike, carried out by a terror group based in Pakistan, was a classic trans-border terrorist event", he added. The former Pakistan NSA also hit out at JUD chief Hafiz Saeed+ .

"Hafiz Saeed has no utility, we should act against him," Durrani said. India had earlier this month asked Pakistan to reinvestigate the 2008 Mumbai terror attack case+ and put on trial Jammat-ud-Dawah chief Hafiz Saeed who is currently under house arrest in Lahore under the anti-terrorism law.

2018/ Nawaz Sharif admits Pakistanis’ role

Nawaz Sharif admits Pakistan played a role in 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, May 12, 2018: The Times of India

HIGHLIGHTS

Sharif tacitly admitted that Pakistan played a role in the 26/11 terror attack in Mumbai

Referring to Pakistani terrorists as "non-state actors", Sharif said they had carried out the series of attacks in Mumbai in 2008

Former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has tacitly admitted in an interview that Pakistan played a role + in the 26/11 + Mumbai terror attacks.

Speaking to Dawn, Sharif stated that terrorist organisations were thriving in Pakistan and "non-state actors" were responsible for the series of coordinated attacks in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 which claimed over 160 lives.

Without naming Mumbai attack mastermind Hafiz Saeed + and Masood Azhar's terror outfits -- Jamaat-ud-Dawah and Jaish-e-Mohammad, -- operating in the country with impunity, Sharif said: "Militant organisations are active. Call them non-state actors, should we allow them to cross the border and kill 150 people in Mumbai?"

The PML-N leader was questioning why the trial into the Mumbai attacks was stalled at a Rawalpindi anti-terrorism court.

"Why can’t we complete the trial? It’s absolutely unacceptable. This is exactly what we are struggling for. President Putin has said it. President Xi has said it," he said.

Sharif, 68, was ousted from power when the Supreme Court disqualified him from holding public office for life following his involvement in the Panama Papers case. In February, the apex court also disqualified Sharif as the head of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).

Citing the military and judiciary establishment, Sharif further said: "You can't run a country if you have two or three parallel governments. This has to stop. There can only be one government - the constitutional one."

The relations between the military and the Sharif government were at its lowest ebb in October 2016 when the latter told the former to act against home grown militant groups or face international isolation.

The Mumbai attack case has entered into the 10th year but none of its suspects in Pakistan has been punished yet, showing that the case had never been in the priority list of the country that appears to be keen to put it under the carpet.

A number of Pakistani witnesses, both official and private, testified and provided evidence against the seven accused, but the Pakistani authorities have been insisting on sending Indian witnesses for reaching a verdict in the case.

Admission by Tariq Khosa, former DG, FIA, Pakistan

Dawn, August 3, 2015

Tariq Khosa

Tariq Khosa

The Mumbai terror attacks were claimed by India to be its 9/11. For more than 66 hours, 10 highly trained militants played havoc in India’s commercial metropolis, spraying bullets and shedding the blood of innocent civilians and tourists in November 2008, bringing the two nuclear neighbours to the brink of an all-out war.

Pakistan has to deal with the Mumbai mayhem, planned and launched from its soil. This requires facing the truth and admitting mistakes. The entire state security apparatus must ensure that the perpetrators and masterminds of the ghastly terror attacks are brought to justice. The case has lingered on for far too long. Dilatory tactics by the defendants, frequent change of trial judges, and assassination of the case prosecutor as well as retracting from original testimony by some key witnesses have been serious setbacks for the prosecutors. However, cognizance was taken by the Islamabad High Court which directed the trial to be concluded within two months.

The following facts are pertinent. First, Ajmal Kasab was a Pakistani national, whose place of residence and initial schooling as well as his joining a banned militant organisation was established by the investigators. Second, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists were imparted training near Thatta, Sindh and launched by sea from there. The training camp was identified and secured by the investigators. The casings of the explosive devices used in Mumbai were recovered from this training camp and duly matched. Third, the fishing trawler used by the terrorists for hijacking an Indian trawler in which they sailed to Mumbai, was brought back to harbour, then painted and concealed. It was recovered by the investigators and connected to the accused. Fourth, the engine of the dinghy abandoned by the terrorists near Mumbai harbour contained a patent number through which the investigators traced its import from Japan to Lahore and then to a Karachi sports shop from where an LeT-linked militant purchased it along with the dinghy. The money trail was followed and linked to the accused who was arrested. Fifth, the ops room in Karachi, from where the operation was directed, was also identified and secured by the investigators. The communications through Voice over Internet Protocol were unearthed. Sixth, the alleged commander and his deputies were identified and arrested. Seventh, a couple of foreign-based financiers and facilitators were arrested and brought to face trial.

After an exchange of multiple investigation dossiers with the Indian police authorities, the trial court was requested to give approval to obtain voice samples of the alleged commander and his deputies for comparison with the recorded voices. The court ruled that the consent of the accused should be obtained. Obviously, the suspects refused. Then a plea was submitted before the sessions court to authorise the investigators to take the voice samples despite the lack of consent. The plea was denied on account of there being no such provision in the Evidence Act or the antiterrorism law applicable at that time. The investigators then went in appeal before the High Court. That appeal, I believe, is still pending. The Fair Trial Act, 2013 caters for admissibility of such technical evidence. However, its application with retrospective effect is a moot point.

The Mumbai case is quite unique: one incident with two jurisdictions and two trials. While the Indians managed to nab Ajmal Kasab and were able to obtain his confession to close the trial, proving conspiracy in a different jurisdiction is more complex and requires a far superior quality of evidence. Therefore, the legal experts from both sides need to sit together rather than sulk and point fingers.

Indian interlocutors, engaged during the talks between the then prime ministers of India and Pakistan in Egypt in 2009, had conceded that the Pakistani investigators had done a professional job in the indictment of seven perpetrators of the attack. However, the Pakistani authorities should not forget that the FIA declared various other facilitators and operatives as fugitives in the case. The trial will not be over with the disposal of those under arrest or on bail. Other missing links need to be uncovered after the absconders’ arrest.

Pakistani probe

2015: Tardy

The Times of India, Aug 27 2015

Bharti Jain

FIA failed to probe Hafiz's 26/11 role: Dossier 

India had planned to confront Pakistan at the NSA-level talks on the loose ends in the 2611 probe conducted on its soil, particularly the Federal Investigation Agency's (FIA) failure to examine Lashker mastermind Hafiz Saeed's role as exposed by American terrorist David Headley's exwife Faiza Outalha. Citing the findings of the FBI investigation into Headley's links to the Mumbai attacks, NSA Ajit Doval's dossier to Pakistani counterpart Sartaj Aziz had sought examining of Outalha by FIA to corroborate her claims regarding Saeed's involvement in planning the attack and overseeing training and preparation of the 10-member LeT attack module. After her divorce, Outalha claimed to have met Hafiz Saeed at a Lahore mosque frequented by Headley as she tried to find out more about her exhusband. She had sensed that Headley had links with terror outfits and was possibly connected to the Mumbai attacks.In fact, they had visited Taj hotel and Oberoi-Trident, both targeted in 2611 attacks, as a newly-married couple before the 2008 strikes and taken pictures of the two hotels and other sites. At that time, she had no idea about Headley's terror re connaissance mission.

Later, however, she got an inkling of Headley's terror links. She had even briefed NIA on his trips to various Indian cities post-2611, purportedly to scout Jewish synagogues for future LeT strikes. Incidentally, the emails exchanged between Headley and his LeT handler Sajid Majid had documented that the conspiracy to attack various Indian cities was approved by Saeed.

India's dossier for NSA-lev el talks would have insisted that Outalha be examined by FIA to get evidence against Saeed.

The dossier also faulted FIA for confining the probe to the period 2007-2008, when the conspiracy to commit terror acts in India was hatched between 2005 and 2008. India believes recee of the targets, done by Headly and handled by Sajid Majid, Abdur Rehman Pasha and Pak Army officers Major Iqbal and Major Samir, is an aspect that was never investigated.

Also, the FIA investigated only the Karachi part of the conspiracy , overlooking the links to Muzaffarabad, Muridke and Lahore. The role of ISI, the dossier underlined, was not looked into, even though it is needed to prove the chain of evidence.

Prosecutor removed for not toeing Pakistani line

Omer Farooq Khan, Pak sacks 26/11 prosecutor for not toeing govt’s line, April 30, 2018: The Times of India

‘Azhar Going By Book Led To Differences’

In a blow to India’s efforts to bring the perpetrators of 26/11 to justice, Pakistan’s interior ministry removed the chief prosecutor from the nine-year-old case for his “unbiased and independent” approach.

The prosecutor’s attitude was not considered by authorities to be synchronised with the government’s line, an official privy to the development was quoted by the media as saying on Sunday.

The move comes two days after the US urged Pakistan to fully cooperate with India to investigate the Mumbai attacks. “We want to see justice done and we continue to urge Pakistani cooperation,” Mark Toner, US State Department spokesperson had said.

An official of Federal Investigation Agency told PTI that the interior ministry has removed FIA’s special prosecutor Chaudhry Azhar, who had been serving as chief of prosecution in the high-profile case since 2009. Explaining his differences with the government, the official said, “He was keen to go by the book in the high-profile case.”

Pakistan persuaded India’s Home Secy to stay in Murree

The Times of India, Jun 11 2016

Bharti Jain

While Mumbai burned, home secy, other top officials were busy enjoying Pak hospitality

Though it's wellknown that the 26|11 attack was launched just as IndiaPakistan home-secretary level talks ended in Islamabad on November 26, 2008, it has now come to light that then home secretary Madhukar Gupta and some senior officials were persuaded by the hosts to extend their stay by a day at the picturesque hill retreat of Murree. The revelation is surprising, not just because it took seven-and-a-half years for the overnight stay at Murree to come to light, but also because there does not seem to be any convincing explanation as to why senior home ministry officials chose to re main in Pakistan.

The apparent reason offered by the Pakistanis was that the delegation should meet the interior minister, who was then travelling. “It does raise questions as to why the Pakistanis insisted on the Indian delegation staying back an extra day after the home secretary-level talks had already concluded.Gupta was told on November 26 that he could call on the interior minister only on November 27, 2008, as the latter was travelling,“ said a former official who was in the home ministry at the time.

Both the request as well as the decision of the Indian officials to stay in Pakistan seems puzzling in the light of the unfolding mayhem in Mumbai. “Though we had been staying in Islamabad for two days, the host country made special plans to shift us to a nearby hill resort in Murree. In retrospect, it leads us to suspect if the real motive was to delay or weaken the response of Indian security brass to the 2611 strikes,“ said a former bureaucrat.

Apart from possible Pakistani motives, the decision to accept the proposal shows the Indian delegation in poor light as 10 Lashker-e-Taiba terrorists, duly guided by handlers who included serving officers of Pakistan's ISI, hitting multiple targets in Mumbai the same night is not seen as a coincidence.

Gupta, along with additional secretary (border management) Anwar Ahsan Ahmad, a last-minute addition to the delegation, joint secretary (internal security) Diptivilasa and other officers of the Indian internal security establishment spent the fateful night at Murree, which a former home ministry official now claims had weak pho ne signals.

The 10 terrorists struck between 8pm and 9pm on November 26 and the home ministry got into action around 9.40pm. According to an exbureaucrat, Gupta, on learning of the Mumbai strikes from a private person, called up special secretary (internal security) in the home ministry M L Kumawat, who was managing the initial response as per instructions of then home minister Shivraj Patil, around 11pm.

However, he was advised not to discuss any details of the response due to fears that the Pakistani agencies may be listening in.

So it was left for Kumawat to pilot the initial counter-response and ask NSG to rush to Mumbai. This, while then joint secretary (north-east) Naveen Verma and under-secretary (internal security) R V S Mani reportedly manned the home ministry control room that night.

When contacted, Mani recalled how he and Verma spent tense hours in the control room, trying to gather details of the gunfight raging in Mumbai. “In the first few hours itself, ATS chief Hemant Karkare was killed. So we were trying to get updates from two top officers of the Mumbai police -commissioner Hassan Gafoor (on Taj attack) and joint CP (law and order) K L Prasad (on the encounter at Trident),“ he told TOI.

By the morning of November 27, the security brass led by then NSA M K Narayanan had taken charge of things. Sources said Gupta finished off his engagement with Pakistan interior secretary and was back in Delhi on November 27 afternoon, having advanced his scheduled departure from Islamabad by a few hours.

See also

Mumbai

Mumbai blasts: 1993

Mumbai: Terrorism