Revision as of 13:03, 9 November 2016

A comparison of the economies of China and India on selected developmental parameters, as in Jan 2016; Graphic courtesy: The Times of India Jan 9 2016

The military strengths of China and India in 2015; Graphic courtesy: The Times of India, November 13, 2015

India vis-à-vis China, a comparison of defence capabilities, as in 2015; Graphic courtesy: The Times of India, Sep 04 2015

From the 2013 archives of The Times of India

Ladakh and Arunachal

India Handed Dispute In Legacy

Did India inherit the border dispute from the British?

Yes. The genesis lies in British efforts in the mid-1930s to annex Chinese territory in the Northeast to give India what ‘a strategic frontier’

What area were the Brits eyeing?

A sweep of Chinese territory at the edge of the Tibetan Plateau. The effort in 1914 failed, but in the 1940s the British moved into these areas

How did the Chinese react then?

They complained and complained against the British intrusions

Was the issue alive in 1947, when India became independent?

Yes. It was the first matter Nehru addressed as PM after he assumed offi ce

The Historic Address

On Nov 20, 1962, after Bomdila fell to Chinese soldiers, Nehru spoke on AIR. He said, “Huge Chinese armies have been marching in the northern part of NEFA. We have had reverses at Walong, Se La and Bomdila… We shall not rest till the invader goes out of India or is pushed out. I want to make that clear to all of you, and, especially our countrymen in Assam, to whom our heart goes out at this moment.” Many in Assam say the speech rankles to this day. They believe Delhi wasn’t really concerned about the Brahmaputra Valley. Nehru’s defenders insist he almost wept as he spoke. The speech was followed by virtual hysteria in Tezpur and many began fl eeing.

China to raze tomb of Buddhist monk with Indian links

From the archives of The Times of India

Saibal Dasgupta

April 13, 2013

Beijing: A portion of a temple that contains the remains of Xuanzang, the monk who brought Buddhist scriptures from India, is threatened with demolition. The temple in Xian in north China contains the tomb of the monk, who played a key role in introducing Buddhism in China during the seventh century. The local government in Chang’an in Xian claims it needs to clear a portion of the structure to strengthen the temple’s application for Unesco World Heritage status. It says it wants to remove buildings including a dining hall and a dormitory that were not part of the original 1300-year old temple, and were added in later years. Xuanzang and his Monkey King associate, Sun Wukong, are the heroes of the Chinese classic, “Journey to the West” that every Chinese child learns in school. The demolition is set to begin on June 30. But the move has sparked protests from monks and believers, who complain it was affecting their day to day worshipping. The Xingjiao temple, which is in the centre of the controversy has withdrawn its participation in the provincial government’s move to obtain the world heritage status. “If they demolish the buildings under the current plan, is it still possible that the application will be vetoed by the international panel,” temple spokesman Master Kuanshu told local journalists indicating he did not agree with the provincial government.

Initiatives

“One Belt One Road”

The Hindu, February 2, 2016

Samir Saran and Ritika Passi

China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ could potentially allow India a new track on its own attempt to integrate South Asia.

The central feature of much of the post-World War II American external engagement has been the security of its energy interests. Likewise, recent conversations with Chinese scholars, Communist Party of China members and officials indicate that the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative of Xi Jinping’s government is likely to become the lynchpin of Chinese engagement with the world. If, to understand American foreign policy of the years past, many have ‘followed the oil’, to decipher Chinese interests going forward, we may just have to ride the Belt and the Road.

At the third edition of the India-China Think-Tank Dialogue in Beijing, hosted in January 2016, a cross-section of Chinese scholars and officials discussed India-China relations and prospects for regional cooperation. The conversation cursorily engaged with the usual tensions in the bilateral relationship; instead, the centrepiece of all discussion was the OBOR initiative.

A Mandarin tale

Some facets of the new formulations that are giving shape to Beijing’s vision for OBOR and Asia could be discerned at this recent interaction.

The first was the novel idea of ‘entity diplomacy’. This construction argues for engaging within and across regions to secure the best interests of an entity that is necessarily larger and with interests broader than those of any sovereign. This follows from the argument of a revival of ‘continentalism’ as the Eurasian landmass deepens linkages and ‘Asia’ emerges. OBOR segues perfectly into this framework. It becomes, for the Chinese, an Asian undertaking that needs to be evaluated on the gains it accrues to the entity, i.e. Asia, as opposed to China alone. It therefore follows, from Beijing’s perspective, that Indian and other Asian nations must support and work for the OBOR initiative.

Entity diplomacy also translates into the establishment of “one economic continent”, the second theme undergirding the conversation. OBOR, then, becomes a vehicle that promotes alignment of infrastructure, trade and economic strategies. Indeed, for some Chinese speakers, India is already part of the initiative, as its own projects like Project Mausam and economic initiatives such as Make in India and Digital India complement and complete OBOR. Indian participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and joint ownership of the New Development Bank only reaffirm India’s partnership in this Asian project for many in Beijing.

To counter popular allegations of OBOR being a “Chinese scheme”, à la the U.S. Marshall Plan, the Chinese were quick to clarify that the original project is named the Belt and Road Initiative; the ‘One’ has been an English effect that has popularised a mien of exclusivity around OBOR, to the primary advantage of China, instead of an inclusive Asian economic project.

The third formulation was that of a mutually beneficial ‘swap’ — India protecting Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean, and China securing India’s essential undertakings in their part of the waters, read the South and East China Seas. However, there was unambiguous clarity that if India cannot assume more responsibility in the Indian Ocean, China will step in.

Core conflicts

Structural challenges confront the Chinese formulations and the OBOR proposal. First, the perception, process and implementation to date do not inspire trust in OBOR as a participatory and collaborative venture. The unilateral ideation and declaration — and the simultaneous lack of transparency — further weaken any sincerity towards an Asian entity and economic unity. The Chinese participants explained that Beijing is committed to pursuing wide-ranging consultations with the 60-plus nations OBOR implicates; an ‘OBOR Think Tank’ is also being established to engage scholars from these countries.

The second poser for the Chinese is on Beijing’s appetite for committing its political capital to the project. While for obvious reasons the Chinese would not want to be seen as projecting their military and political presence along OBOR, it was clear that China is willing to underwrite security through a collaborative framework.

The third challenge deals with the success of the ‘whole’ scheme, given that the Chinese vision document lays out five layers of connectivity: policy, physical, economic, financial and human. While no developing country will turn away infrastructure development opportunities financed by the Chinese, they may not necessarily welcome a rules regime built on a Chinese ethos.

Finally, how can this initiative navigate the irreconcilable geometries of South Asia that prevent India from providing full backing to OBOR? A formal nod to the project will serve as a de-facto legitimisation to Pakistan’s rights on Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that is “closely related” to OBOR.

Options for India Fundamentally, New Delhi needs to resolve for itself whether OBOR represents a threat or an opportunity. The answer undoubtedly ticks both boxes. Chinese political expansion and economic ambitions, packaged as OBOR, are two sides of the same coin. To be firm while responding to one facet, while making use of the opportunities that become available from the other, will largely depend on the institutional agency and strategic imagination India is able to bring to the table.

First and foremost, India needs to match ambition with commensurate augmentation of its capacities that allows it to be a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region. This will require New Delhi to not only overcome its chronic inability to take speedy decisions with respect to defence partnerships and procurement, but will also necessitate a sustained period of predictable economic growth; OBOR can assist in the latter.

Therefore, just as U.S. trade and economic architecture underwrote the rise of China, Chinese railways, highways, ports and other capacities can serve as catalysts and platforms for sustained Indian double-digit growth. Simultaneously, India can focus on developing last-mile connectivity in its own backyard linking to the OBOR — the slip roads to the highways, the sidetracks to the Iron Silk Roads.

Arguably, OBOR offers India another political opportunity. There seems to be a degree of Chinese eagerness to solicit Indian partnership. Can India seek reworking of the CPEC by Beijing in return for its active participation? Furthermore, for the stability of the South Asian arm of OBOR, can Beijing be motivated to become a meaningful interlocutor prompting rational behaviour from Islamabad? OBOR could potentially allow India a new track to its own attempt to integrate South Asia.

India's stands on South China Sea

The Times of India, May 4, 2016

Indrani Bagchi

India's different stands on S China Sea lead to confusion

What exactly is India's position on the South China Sea? In two recent international joint statements, India has taken slightly different positions on the biggest point of international conflict that is about to come to a head in the coming days, leading to some confusion.

On April 18, foreign ministers of India, China and Russia stated after an RIC meeting in Moscow that “Russia, India and China are committed to maintaining a legal order for the seas and oceans based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS).All related disputes should be addressed through negotiations and agreements between the parties concerned. In this regard, the Ministers called for full respect of all provisions of UNCLOS, as well as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the Guidelines for the implementation of the DOC.“

But just about a week ear lier, when US defence secretary Ashton Carter was in Delhi, a joint statement between him and Manohar Parrikar had this to say: US and India “reaffirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, including in the South China Sea.They vowed their support for a rules-based order and regional security architecture conducive to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean, and emphasised their commitment to working together and with other nations to ensure the security and stability that have been beneficial to the Asia-Pacific for decades.“

Both affirmations are slightly different, raising questions about what Indi a's actual position is. Sources said the RIC statement was in the context of a multilateral forum, but India's sovereign position will be clarified on the day the permanent court of arbitration pronounces its verdict.

China has declared in its state media outlets that India is sympathetic to China's view, and the RIC statement affirms it. Meanwhile, US Pacific Command chief, Admiral Harris indicated India and US may soon be sailing together for joint patrols, as part of a roadmap of the Strategic Vision document signed when Barack Obama visited India in 2015.

The official Chinese position was clarified by the charge d'affairs at the Chinese embassy here. Speaking to TOI, Liu Jinsong said, “We do not accept the jurisdiction in the South China Sea arbitration at the request of Philippines.The matter concerns China's territorial sovereignty , which is beyond the scope of UNCLOS. We can settle and manage the issue bilaterally through peaceful means based on international law, including UNCLOS.“

See also

China-India trade