Freedom of speech: India
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Bona fide opinions
From the archives of The Times of India 2010
‘Remarks On Premarital Sex Bona Fide Opinion’
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
New Delhi: There was redemption for south Indian actress Khushboo on Wednesday after five long years of battling 23 cases filed across Tamil Nadu against her remarks on prevalence of premarital sex in Indian cities. Putting an end to her harassment, the Supreme Court quashed all proceedings pending against her in trial courts, saying the complaints woefully lacked in evidence.
A bench comprising Chief Justice K G Balakrishnan and Justices Deepak Verma and B S Chauhan, said those who filed complaints against the 39-year-old actress were ‘‘extra-sensitive’’ about the remarks made by her in 2005 and had no proof that these had disturbed the peace or hurt people’s sentiments.
The Madras HC had on April 30 last year refused to stay the proceedings in trial courts. Khushboo had introduced herself in the SC as a ‘‘famous south Indian actress, a mother of two young children’’ and said she was being harassed and victimized at the behest of people with vested interests who had filed 23 ‘‘false, frivolous and mala fide’’ complaints.
She had added that her fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression could not be curtailed by such persons.
The apex court agreed with Khushboo that her comments, to a news magazine, were in response to a survey conducted about pre-marital sex in big cities in India and that it was a bona fide opinion.
Sedition and the law (S.124-A IPC)
Criticism of government is not sedition: Bombay HC
The Times of India, Mar 18 2015
Swati Deshpande
`Trivedi toons lacked wit, but not seditious'
A citizen can say or write anything critical about the government, or its measures, as long it does not incite violence or is intended to dis rupt public peace and create disorder, the Bombay HC said while holding that cartoons by Aseem Trivedi in 2011 lacked wit but were not seditious as charged by the police. The HC also directed the police to “scrupulously implement new guidelines issued by the Maharashtra government that place checks on filing frivolous sedition cases.
“Cartoons or caricatures are visual representations, words or signs which are supposed to have an element of wit, humour or sarcasm. Having seen the seven cartoons in question, it is difficult to find wit, humour or sarcasm. The cartoons at a meeting on November 27, 2011, in Mumbai, as part of a movement by Anna Hazare against corruption in India, were full of anger and disgust against corruption in the political system and had no wit, humour or sarcasm, the HC said on Tuesday , holding that the sedition charge was not attracted against Trivedi.
“But for that reason, the freedom of speech and expression available to Trivedi to express indignation against corruption in the political system in strong terms or visual representations could not have been encroached upon when there is no allegation of incitement to violence or tendency or intention to create public disorder, the HC bench of Chief Justice Mohit Shah and Jus tice Nitin Jamdar said.
Trivedi's arrest was for serious criminal life imprisonment attracting charge of sedition, among other offences. But the HC ordered his bail three days after his arrest on September 11 following a plea by a city lawyer, and then state advocategeneral Darius Khambata found the invocation excessive. The Bandra-Kurla Complex then dropped the sedition charge.
Maharasthra circular of 2015
The Times of India, Sep 05 2015
Maha issues fresh norms on sedition, draws oppn's ire
People trying to bring change in government through legal means will not face sedition charge in Maharashtra, but those attempting to bring into “hatred or contempt, dissatisfaction and provoking violence“ against the central or state government will be slapped with sedition charges. These provisions are part of a fresh set of guidelines issued to police by the Maharashtra government with regard to invocation of the IPC Section (124-A) pertaining to sedition.
The circular containing these guidelines says sedition clause can be invoked against “whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representation, is critical of politicians, elected representatives belonging to the government“.
They were issued in compliance with an assurance given to the Bombay high court by state government while dropping sedition charge against cartoonist Aseem Trivedi, arrested in 2012 for drawing cartoons that allegedly insulted the national emblem and Parliament. The guidelines were issued on August 27 in accordance with assurance in the HC that the government would come out with a circular indicating limitations and parameters of 124-A of IPC, additional chief secretary (home) K P Bakshi said.
“Powers to invoke different sections of IPC are with the station officer. Government can issue guidelines, hence, we have done so to avoid confusion among different police stations,“ he said on Friday.
The circular drew flak from the opposition parties.Leader of opposition in legislative council Dhananjay Munde of NCP said the move indicated an “Emergency like” situation.
Insulting comments
From the archives of The Times of India 2010
SC upholds ban on book against Islam
New Delhi: The SC on Friday said it was more concerned with peace in society than a person’s fundamental right to freedom of speech and upheld a Maharashtra government ban on a book titled “A Concept of Political World Invasion by Muslims”.
Petitioner R V Bhasin had challenged Maharashtra’s decision four years after the publication of the book to ban it on the ground that it perpetrated hatred. The Bombay HC had said that government committed no wrong by banning the book. “The way this sensitive topic is handled by the author, it is likely to arouse the emotions and sensibilities of even strong minded people... criticism of Islam is permissible like criticism of any religion and the book cannot be banned on that ground...But the author has gone on to pass insulting comments.”
Section 66A
P. Rajeev
March 27, 2015
The scrapping of Section 66A proves that a bad law will not stand the test of judicial scrutiny
Few provisions of law have attracted as much criticism from the entire spectrum of Indian citizenry as Section 66A. Although the legislative intent was primarily to tackle internet spam, it quickly became clear that this provision of law was susceptible to wanton abuse.
The Lok Sabha had passed this amendment bill along with six other enactments without any discussion in a span of just seven minutes on December 23, 2008; the Rajya Sabha also passed it the next day. Parliament did not get an opportunity to discuss it in detail.
In a democracy, passing bills in Parliament amid din is always objectionable. It is true that the Constitution bestows upon the judiciary the power of review, but Parliament should ensure that the legislations it enacts should not be ultra vires, i.e. beyond its legal power or authority. But in this case, Parliament failed to do so. I tried twice to rectify this by moving a statutory motion and private members' resolution. I moved the first annulment motion in the history of Parliament to scrap the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules. There was a debate in Parliament on this issue and then IT minister Kapil Sibal assured the House of making changes after consultations with all stakeholders. But the government failed to keep the assurance.
The second occasion was during the discussion on a private members' resolution which urged the government to amend Section 66A in accordance with Article 19(2) of the Constitution. I recall Sibal's intervention: "The limits of exercise of freedom of expression in the social media can't be constitutionally prescribed because when the Constitution was framed, there was no social media. There was only the print media." Now, the Supreme Court has correctly ruled that even though the internet may be treated separately from other media and there could be separate laws, these laws still have to pass the test of "reasonable restrictions" on free speech allowed by Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
When we raised concerns on the vagueness of the terms used in the act, Sibal had said, "Please don't ask us to define that cannot be defined. What annoys you may not annoy me." This argument has been torpedoed by the apex court in its judgment in para 74: "If one looks at Section 294, the annoyance that is spoken of is clearly defined-that is, it has to be caused by obscene utterances or acts. Equally, under Section 510, the annoyance that is caused to a person must only be by another person who is in a state of intoxication and who annoys such person only in a public place or in a place for which it is a trespass for him to enter. Such narrowly and closely defined contours of offences made out under the Penal Code are conspicuous by their absence in Section 66A which in stark contrast uses completely open ended, undefined and vague language."
By striking down a provision of law that lent itself to blatant abuse often at the behest of vested political interests, the court has demonstrated once again that bad law will not stand the test of judicial scrutiny and liberty of expression are accorded the highest levels of constitutional protection.
Free speech recognises one's right to dissent and protest. Although the judiciary had come up with judgments putting heavy restrictions on the freedom to protest of late, this judgment can be viewed as a milestone in recognising freedom of dissent as an integral part of free speech. In a civilised state, internet regulation is essential but that doesn't mean it should be completely controlled. There must be freedom with reasonable constitutional restrictions.
Restrictions specified under Article 19(2)
The Times of India, Aug 10 2015
Dhananjay Mahapatra
Freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has long been regarded as the second most important after the right to life of a citizen. In recent times, it appears to be the most misused right in India, especially on the internet. Take, for example, the Yakub Memon hanging case.Views expressed on the issue were sharply divided on merits and veered to religious lines. It led to clash of ideologies, open spats, painting those who favoured execution as `bloodthirsty' and those who opposed it as `traitors'.
Freedom of speech on the internet is scaling new internet is scaling new heights every day with complete disregard for the restrictions specified under Article 19(2). Netizens are always in a rush. They post their views the moment they come across a statement.Mostly , it either gets a thumbs up or derisive criticism. The degree of controversy attached to an issue increases the severity of cuss words.
If one advocates stay of hanging of a terrorist, he gets slammed as a left-leaning activist fed on foreign funds. If one argues for the hanging, the `activists' slam him as a bloodthirsty rightwinger. By indulging in such slanderous accusations, ostensibly in exercise of right to freedom of speech, are the two groups not infringing upon the right to life of each other? For, right to life includes a life with dignity .
People may not agree with each other on a certain issue, but does it prevent them from being civil and secular while expressing their views? If a person has objection to such abuse on internet, does he have an effective legal remedy? Is it not cumbersome and a waste of time to go after those who use cuss words? And was this the intention of the Constitution-framers, and later the Supreme Court, to give such wide meaning and interpretation to freedom of expression? In Shreya Singhal case, the Supreme Court recognized the problem that could arise if every person aggrieved by abusive criticism of his view on the internet was to make a request directly to the service provider to take down the offending comments.
It had read down Section 79(3)(b) of the Information and Technology Act contemplating action against service providers for abusive comments on websites hosted by them. It had said such action could be taken against the service provider only if it failed to comply with the court order directing it to take down the material which had been held to be abusive or offensive on the basis of a complaint. “This is for the reason that otherwise, it would be very difficult for intermediaries like Google, Facebook etc to act when millions of requests are made and the intermediary is then to judge as to which of such requests are legitimate and which are not,“ it had said.
But who will have the time and energy to pursue a case in a court of law by filing a complaint against persons who used abuses to criticize his view? The type and kinds of names under which comments are posted on websites these days would make it extremely difficult for a complainant to find out the actual name and address of the author who violated his dig nity and reputation. And when there is a systematic group attack against a view, it is better for the person to silently stomach the abuse.
The absence of protection against abuses, invectives and cuss words expressed freely to register dissenting view is the deterrent for many in society from using their real names to express views on the internet.
In a recent judgment on the criminality of a poet in using Mahatma Gandhi as a fictitious character and attributing abusive words to him to depict society , the Supreme Court said freedom of speech did not protect the poet from facing trial under Section 292 of Indian Penal Code for indulging in obscenity .
Justice Dipak Misra, writing the judgment in Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar case, said a poet was “free to depart from the reality; fly away from grammar; walk in glory by not following the systematic metres; coin words at his own will; use archaic words to convey thoughts or attribute meanings; hide ideas beyond myths which can be absolutely unrealistic; totally pave a path where neither rhyme nor rhythm prevail; can put serious ideas in satires, notorious repartees; take aid of analogies, metaphors... and one can do nothing except writing a critical appreciation in his own manner and according to his understanding“.
Despite this poetic licence for freedom speech and expression, the SC was clear that “a person's human dignity must be respected, regardless of whether the person is a well-known figure or not“. But except for moving court against rogue elements on the internet, does a person aggrieved by a torrent of abuse have an immediate remedy? The time is ripe for legislators to think about it.
No poetic licence to make Bapu swear: SC
May 15 2015
Dhananjay Mahapatra
The Supreme Court ruled against poetic licence stretching the right to freedom of expression to cast revered figures like Mahatma Gandhi as a character in a fictional work and attributing obscene words to him. A bench of Justices Dipak Misra and P C Pant upheld the prosecution launched against Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar, editor of magazine `Bulletin' meant for private circulation among members of the All India Bank Association Union, for the poem `Gandhi Mala Bhetala' (I met Gandhi). The poem, written by Vasant Dattatreya Gurjar, was published in the July-August 1994 issue of the magazine. However, it discharged the printer and publisher as they had tendered apologies.
The judgment, authored by Justice Misra, dealt exhaustively with the issue of obscenity , referred to works of famous authors and poets across the world, extracted passages from 40-odd books on Gandhi written by Indians and foreigners and tested poetic licence on the touchstone of `contemporary community standards'.
The question before the court was “whether in a write-up or a poem, keeping in view the concept and conception of poetic licence and the liberty of perception and expression, using the name of a historically respected personality by way of allusion or symbol is permissible“? Using his educational background in literature, Justice Misra dug deep into the works of famous authors to convey what poetic licence was intended to serve and whether using historically revered figures as characters in a poem and attributing obscene words to them served that purpose. Tuljapurkar had claimed that he used the obscene words, as if spoken by Gandhi, to convey the angst in society. He faces prosecution under Section 292 of IPC, which is punishable by upto five years in jail.
The bench accepted sub missions of amicus curiae Fali S Nariman, who said, “Words that had been used in various stanzas of the poem, if spoken in the voice of an ordinary man or by any other person, it may not come under the ambit and sweep of Section 292, but the moment there is established identity pertaining to Mahatma Gandhi, the character of the words change and they assume the position of obscenity .“
The SC said, “Freedom of speech and expression has to be given a broad canvas, but it has to have inherent limitations which are permissible within the constitutional parameters.“ An author's fallacy in imagination could not be attributed to historically revered figures to diminish their value in the minds of people, the bench said. If an author used obscene words and attributed it to such personalities, then he travelled into the field of perversity , it added.
