Terrorism in India - Revision history

Jyoti: /* Terrorist attacks on India */

2022-02-16T20:19:06Z

‎Terrorist attacks on India

Jyoti: /* Right-wing groups accused of terrorism */

2021-09-26T18:26:35Z

‎Right-wing groups accused of terrorism

Jyoti: /* War on terror, India’s */

2021-09-26T18:20:08Z

‎War on terror, India’s

Jyoti: /* War on terror, India’s= */

2021-09-26T15:04:50Z

‎War on terror, India’s=

Jyoti: /* YEAR-WISE STATISTICS/ DEVELOPMENTS/ TRENDS */

2021-09-26T15:03:26Z

‎YEAR-WISE STATISTICS/ DEVELOPMENTS/ TRENDS

Jyoti: /* YEAR-WISE STATISTICS/ DEVELOPMENTS/ TRENDS */

2021-09-26T15:02:03Z

‎YEAR-WISE STATISTICS/ DEVELOPMENTS/ TRENDS

Jyoti: /* YEAR-WISE STATISTICS/ DEVELOPMENTS/ TRENDS */

2021-09-26T11:24:42Z

‎YEAR-WISE STATISTICS/ DEVELOPMENTS/ TRENDS

Jyoti: /* Court verdicts */

2021-04-14T07:42:34Z

‎Court verdicts

Jyoti: /* World ranking */

2020-12-01T06:30:47Z

‎World ranking

Jyoti at 17:19, 24 November 2020

2020-11-24T17:19:45Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:19, 16 February 2022
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	'' Terrorist attacks on India, 2001-08 ''		'' Terrorist attacks on India, 2001-08 ''

		+	== 2017: How Delhi police foiled ISKP attack==
		+	[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/article-share?article=03_02_2022_005_004_cap_TOI Rajshekhar Jha, February 3, 2022: ''The Times of India'']
		+
		+	New Delhi: The Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) has released the first edition of its magazine, Voice of Khorasan , with a story on 2021 Kabul airport bomber, Abdurrehman al Logari, and his failed Istashadi operation (suicide mission) in Delhi in 2017. Logari, ISKP says, was nabbed just a week before the execution of his deadly task in the city.
		+	ISKP profiled Logari by tracing his childhood in Pakistan, his ability to speak five languages and his passion for journalism as a teenager, and also detailed how he fled the Bagram prison in Afghanistan where he was incarcerated and 11 days later detonated his suicide vest at the airport entrance during an evacuation following the Taliban takeover of Kabul.
		+	Last September, IS's India magazine, Sawt-al-Hind , had confirmed that the Afghan airport bomber had been nabbed in Delhi. Now, the ISKP magazine has published Logari’s first clear photograph and revealed how Delhi Police's Special Cell picked him up from his college and subsequently transferred him to CIA in Kabul. He was interrogated for weeks at the Bagram airbase, with the information provided by him leading to the killing of over 400 ISIS activists in the Hindukush mountains and elsewhere in drone strikes.
		+	Logari, the ISKP mouthpiece says, was born to a wealthy family in Afghanistan's province of Logar in 1996. “After his studies in Pakistan, Logari moved back to Afghanistan in 2016 where he met the operatives of Islamic State at a time when Wilaya Khorasan was newly formed. He underwent training as a mujahid and also became active on social media where he was spreading the message of jihad to several users across the world,” the article says.
		+
		+	During his training, he specialised in explosives and was soon involved in the frontli- nes against the US forces. He “developed an interest” in suicide ops and was selected for an operation. Awaiting his turn, he assisted fellow bombers in recording their “wills” and having them delivered to their families.
		+
		+	“In 2017, he was given a mission to go to India for an Istashadi mission approved by ISKP. He travelled to Delhi and got admission in a private university on the outskirtsof Delhi as a cover-up,” Voice of Khorasan states. “He was arrested one week prior to executing his mission when one of his associates was arrested by Indian intelligence services. ”
		+
		+	The story says that Logari was interrogated in India before he was handed over to the Afghan government. After his deportation to Afghanistan, he was investigated by CIA before he was sentenced to five years in prison and moved to Pur-e-Chalkhi prison in Kabul.
		+
		+	“Having come from a wealthy family, he faced extreme pressure from his family to give up jihad and was offered freedom, money and choice of partner in exchange. However, he remained fir m. Eventually, his family severed all ties with him and deprived him of any financial assistance,” the magazine says. “During the fourth year of his sentence, he suffered from tuberculosis and was moved to Bagram prison on CIA’s request. He was interrogated for two weeks in solitary confinement about suicide operations in Kabul at the time. ”
		+
		+	On August 15 last year, IS raided the prison and freed around 2,000 mujahideen and their families while a massive evacuation process was under way. After his escape from prison, Logari opted against returning home and requested to be sent on a suicide mission. On August 26, he evaded the Taliban checkposts on the road to the Kabul airport and got into a queue at the entrance. He detonated his suicide vest when a security personnel approached him for checks, killing 183 people, including13 US military personnel.
		+
		+	[[Category:Crime\|TTERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIA
		+	TERRORISM IN INDIA]]
		+	[[Category:India\|TTERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIA
		+	TERRORISM IN INDIA]]
		+	[[Category:Pages with broken file links\|TERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIA
		+	TERRORISM IN INDIA]]

	==2018, 19: Special Cell’s achievements==		==2018, 19: Special Cell’s achievements==

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:26, 26 September 2021
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	CM Devendra Fadnavis told TOI the ATS operation was conducted after gathering a lot of intelligence. “The material seized is dangerous and could have been used for antisocial and terror acts,” he said. “The inquiry is still being conducted, and the motive and targets will be extracted through this inquiry,” he said. Sources said the arrested had apparently stored the cache but may not have manufactured the material. The ATS suspects there may be six to seven more sleeper cells in the state .		CM Devendra Fadnavis told TOI the ATS operation was conducted after gathering a lot of intelligence. “The material seized is dangerous and could have been used for antisocial and terror acts,” he said. “The inquiry is still being conducted, and the motive and targets will be extracted through this inquiry,” he said. Sources said the arrested had apparently stored the cache but may not have manufactured the material. The ATS suspects there may be six to seven more sleeper cells in the state .
		+
		+	=War on terror, India’s=
		+	==How 9/11 2001 Shaped India’s War On Terror==
		+	[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL/2021/09/10&entity=Ar01802&sk=C92B0E4C&mode=text Indrani Bagchi, Sep 10, 2021: ''The Times of India'']
		+
		+	When debris from the destruction of the twin towers settled that day, Indian security planners began to join the dots. Could it be, they wondered, that the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 in December 1999 was a dry run for 9/11? Two decades later, that’s an accepted fact.
		+	The epoch-defining terror attack in New York 20 years ago reverberated around the world. It changed the definition of terrorism, the destinies of nations and their foreign policies. It redefined global power equations, and in many parts of the world the aftermath of that event redrew maps. India was profoundly impacted. In the two decades since, the reverberations have reflected in India’s internal and external security policies, foreign policy and strategic outlook.
		+
		+	Al-Qaida was responsible for 9/11, but it inspired an alphabet soup of Pakistansponsored terror groups that targeted India in a series of terror attacks through the following decade. The results were not always what Pakistan intended.
		+
		+	The J&K assembly building was attacked in October 2001, but a bigger one was in store. On December 13, 2001, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorists attacked India’s Parliament. India retaliated with Operation Parakram, a massive mobilisation of troops on the Pakistan border. It was the biggest exercise of coercive diplomacy. Pakistan was forced to move its troops from the Afghan border to the Indian one as, for the next six months, the two sides remained in a precarious standoff. The US engaged in some serious shuttle diplomacy between the two, with the result that by June 2002, Gen Pervez Musharraf had agreed to stop cross-border infiltration by his terrorists into India, as a condition for a drawdown.
		+
		+	Post 9/11, the global security discourse had changed. India was not untouched. First, the international community no longer counselled “restraint” to India. The Bush administration made it clear to Islamabad that India was within its rights to retaliate to terror in any way it saw fit, a direct consequence of the events of 9/11. India was henceforth only hobbled by its meagre capacities and lack of political will, not by international strictures.
		+
		+	India’s definition of terrorism was no longer seen through the Pakistan-India “rivalry” prism, but as part of the ongoing global Islamist terror phenomenon.
		+
		+	We saw terror attacks at the American Centre in Kolkata, Gandhinagar’s Akshardham temple, Mumbai (2002-03), Delhi (2005), IISc Bangalore (2005), and Varanasi (2006). Then came a series of synchronised terror bombings in Mumbai, Delhi, Jaipur, Lucknow and Bangalore, culminating in what has been described as India’s own 9/11 — a threeday assault by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists in Mumbai on November 26, 2008.
		+
		+	These were sensational terror attacks on soft targets. But after 2014, the scale of attacks went up several notches, as terrorists targeted security forces and defence installations. New Pakistani projects of creating Indian “home-grown” terror groups like the Indian Mujahideen, which was funded by Pakistan, or shifting terror targets to security installations under a weird belief that attacking defence forces did not constitute terror, had to be countered.
		+
		+	It was over a decade after 9/11 that India began retaliating more robustly to terror from across the border, and after 2015, India openly took the battle into Pakistan. By this time, India too had evolved its own strategies. Two of them stand out. By 2011-12, as Pakistan rolled out its tactical nuclear weapon Nasr (which India considers to have a terror edge), India indicated that even a midget strike would evoke a massive nuclear response. Second, after the Uri strike (2016) India amped up its response to terror with full military retaliation, as in Balakot in 2019.
		+
		+	India’s repeated assertions that J&K was a cross-border terrorism problem also found international traction. This goes back to 2002: after Musharraf reined in his terrorists from infiltration, the relative calm allowed India to hold its first free and fair elections in J&K. It was a reaffirmation of democracy, as the NC, then in government with the BJP, lost to the PDP-Congress combine. It broke the cycle of violent and rigged elections. India demonstrated political processes could function in the absence of a terror overhang.
		+
		+	India also became more vigilant on terror financing. Aftab Ansari, a Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) terrorist responsible for the American Centre attack, had apparently funnelled ransom money for the 9/11 effort from India. India began to use the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) institution more zealously to go after terror funding in Pakistan, which has stayed on the grey list. UNSC’s terror sanctions have also come in handy for India looking to choke off terror.
		+
		+	On the larger canvas, 9/11 accelerated the process of dehyphenation between India and Pakistan. The process had started after Kargil, but gathered pace. In the first few years this wasn’t easily apparent. The US made Pakistan a major-non NATO ally in 2003, a big setback. But the growing convergence between the US and India, and divergence between the US and Pakistan played their part. By the time the nuclear deal came through in 2008, that de-hyphenation was complete.
		+
		+	On the foreign policy front, India had a 20-year stellar run in Afghanistan, a direct fallout of 9/11. India became the premier development partner, squeezing Pakistan’s “strategic depth”. As the Taliban returned, all that went poof.
		+
		+	The India-US relationship transformed in these 20 years, though it’s not solely attributable to 9/11. The China challenge has become more acute, and the Pakistan relationship is only based on terrorism. India reworked its relationship with Israel and the Islamic world on two seemingly parallel tracks.
		+
		+	But there was a cost. As former diplomat TCA Raghavan puts it, “We embraced a securitised view of the world. We bought into it wholesale. We don’t do enough thinking outside the securitised atmosphere. National interest should not just be national security. Pakistanis have always made that mistake. We should not go down that path.”
		+
		+	[[Category:Crime\|TTERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIA
		+	TERRORISM IN INDIA]]
		+	[[Category:India\|TTERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIA
		+	TERRORISM IN INDIA]]
		+	[[Category:Pages with broken file links\|TERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIA
		+	TERRORISM IN INDIA]]

	=World ranking=		=World ranking=

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:20, 26 September 2021
Line 382:		Line 382:
	While Maoists were involved in 295 total attacks in India, only global outfits ahead of them are Al-Shabaab with 353 attacks, Taliban with 703 attacks and Islamic State with 857 attacks.		While Maoists were involved in 295 total attacks in India, only global outfits ahead of them are Al-Shabaab with 353 attacks, Taliban with 703 attacks and Islamic State with 857 attacks.

−	~~=War on terror, India’s=~~
−	~~==How 9/11 2001 Shaped India’s War On Terror==~~
−	~~[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL/2021/09/10&entity=Ar01802&sk=C92B0E4C&mode=text Indrani Bagchi, Sep 10, 2021: ''The Times of India'']~~

−	When debris from the destruction of the twin towers settled that day, Indian security planners began to join the dots. Could it be, they wondered, that the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 in December 1999 was a dry run for 9/11? Two decades later, that’s an accepted fact.
−	The epoch-defining terror attack in New York 20 years ago reverberated around the world. It changed the definition of terrorism, the destinies of nations and their foreign policies. It redefined global power equations, and in many parts of the world the aftermath of that event redrew maps. India was profoundly impacted. In the two decades since, the reverberations have reflected in India’s internal and external security policies, foreign policy and strategic outlook.
−
−	Al-Qaida was responsible for 9/11, but it inspired an alphabet soup of Pakistansponsored terror groups that targeted India in a series of terror attacks through the following decade. The results were not always what Pakistan intended.
−
−	The J&K assembly building was attacked in October 2001, but a bigger one was in store. On December 13, 2001, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorists attacked India’s Parliament. India retaliated with Operation Parakram, a massive mobilisation of troops on the Pakistan border. It was the biggest exercise of coercive diplomacy. Pakistan was forced to move its troops from the Afghan border to the Indian one as, for the next six months, the two sides remained in a precarious standoff. The US engaged in some serious shuttle diplomacy between the two, with the result that by June 2002, Gen Pervez Musharraf had agreed to stop cross-border infiltration by his terrorists into India, as a condition for a drawdown.
−
−	Post 9/11, the global security discourse had changed. India was not untouched. First, the international community no longer counselled “restraint” to India. The Bush administration made it clear to Islamabad that India was within its rights to retaliate to terror in any way it saw fit, a direct consequence of the events of 9/11. India was henceforth only hobbled by its meagre capacities and lack of political will, not by international strictures.
−
−	~~India’s definition of terrorism was no longer seen through the Pakistan-India “rivalry” prism, but as part of the ongoing global Islamist terror phenomenon.~~
−
−	We saw terror attacks at the American Centre in Kolkata, Gandhinagar’s Akshardham temple, Mumbai (2002-03), Delhi (2005), IISc Bangalore (2005), and Varanasi (2006). Then came a series of synchronised terror bombings in Mumbai, Delhi, Jaipur, Lucknow and Bangalore, culminating in what has been described as India’s own 9/11 — a threeday assault by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists in Mumbai on November 26, 2008.
−
−	These were sensational terror attacks on soft targets. But after 2014, the scale of attacks went up several notches, as terrorists targeted security forces and defence installations. New Pakistani projects of creating Indian “home-grown” terror groups like the Indian Mujahideen, which was funded by Pakistan, or shifting terror targets to security installations under a weird belief that attacking defence forces did not constitute terror, had to be countered.
−
−	It was over a decade after 9/11 that India began retaliating more robustly to terror from across the border, and after 2015, India openly took the battle into Pakistan. By this time, India too had evolved its own strategies. Two of them stand out. By 2011-12, as Pakistan rolled out its tactical nuclear weapon Nasr (which India considers to have a terror edge), India indicated that even a midget strike would evoke a massive nuclear response. Second, after the Uri strike (2016) India amped up its response to terror with full military retaliation, as in Balakot in 2019.
−
−	India’s repeated assertions that J&K was a cross-border terrorism problem also found international traction. This goes back to 2002: after Musharraf reined in his terrorists from infiltration, the relative calm allowed India to hold its first free and fair elections in J&K. It was a reaffirmation of democracy, as the NC, then in government with the BJP, lost to the PDP-Congress combine. It broke the cycle of violent and rigged elections. India demonstrated political processes could function in the absence of a terror overhang.
−
−	India also became more vigilant on terror financing. Aftab Ansari, a Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) terrorist responsible for the American Centre attack, had apparently funnelled ransom money for the 9/11 effort from India. India began to use the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) institution more zealously to go after terror funding in Pakistan, which has stayed on the grey list. UNSC’s terror sanctions have also come in handy for India looking to choke off terror.
−
−	On the larger canvas, 9/11 accelerated the process of dehyphenation between India and Pakistan. The process had started after Kargil, but gathered pace. In the first few years this wasn’t easily apparent. The US made Pakistan a major-non NATO ally in 2003, a big setback. But the growing convergence between the US and India, and divergence between the US and Pakistan played their part. By the time the nuclear deal came through in 2008, that de-hyphenation was complete.
−
−	On the foreign policy front, India had a 20-year stellar run in Afghanistan, a direct fallout of 9/11. India became the premier development partner, squeezing Pakistan’s “strategic depth”. As the Taliban returned, all that went poof.
−
−	The India-US relationship transformed in these 20 years, though it’s not solely attributable to 9/11. The China challenge has become more acute, and the Pakistan relationship is only based on terrorism. India reworked its relationship with Israel and the Islamic world on two seemingly parallel tracks.
−
−	But there was a cost. As former diplomat TCA Raghavan puts it, “We embraced a securitised view of the world. We bought into it wholesale. We don’t do enough thinking outside the securitised atmosphere. National interest should not just be national security. Pakistanis have always made that mistake. We should not go down that path.”

	[[Category:Crime\|TTERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIA		[[Category:Crime\|TTERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIA

@@ Line 382: / Line 382: @@
 While Maoists were involved in 295 total attacks in India, only global outfits ahead of them are Al-Shabaab with 353 attacks, Taliban with 703 attacks and Islamic State with 857 attacks.
-=War on terror, India’s==
+=War on terror, India’s=
 ==How 9/11 2001 Shaped India’s War On Terror==
 [https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL/2021/09/10&entity=Ar01802&sk=C92B0E4C&mode=text  Indrani Bagchi, Sep 10, 2021: ''The Times of India'']
@@ Line 415: / Line 415: @@
 But there was a cost. As former diplomat TCA Raghavan puts it, “We embraced a securitised view of the world. We bought into it wholesale. We don’t do enough thinking outside the securitised atmosphere. National interest should not just be national security. Pakistanis have always made that mistake. We should not go down that path.”
+[[Category:Crime|TTERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIA
 =YEAR-WISE STATISTICS/ DEVELOPMENTS/ TRENDS=

@@ Line 381: / Line 381: @@
 While Maoists were involved in 295 total attacks in India, only global outfits ahead of them are Al-Shabaab with 353 attacks, Taliban with 703 attacks and Islamic State with 857 attacks.
 =YEAR-WISE STATISTICS/ DEVELOPMENTS/ TRENDS=
@@ Line 440: / Line 475: @@
 TERRORISM IN INDIA]]
 [[Category:Pages with broken file links|TERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIA
 TERRORISM IN INDIA]]

@@ Line 407: / Line 407: @@
 In an operation against terrorists from Manipur in September last year, the Special Cell arrested Oinam Ibochouba Singh, the self-styled acting chairman of KCPPWG. A month before this, Moirangthem Rana Pratap, general secretary of the outfit, was also arrested from a hideout in Delhi. The Special Cell is currently headed by deputy commissioners of police Pramod Kushwah and Sanjeev Yadav.
-[[Category:Crime|TTERRORISM IN INDIA
+== Crimes by anti-national elements==
 TERRORISM IN INDIA]]
-[[Category:India|TTERRORISM IN INDIA
+[[Category:India|TTERRORISM IN INDIATERRORISM IN INDIA
 TERRORISM IN INDIA]]

@@ Line 98: / Line 98: @@
 =Court verdicts=
 ==Terror propagandists lethal too: HC==
 [http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com/Article.aspx?eid=31808&articlexml=Terror-propagandists-lethal-too-says-HC-21052017007030  Terror propagandists lethal too, says HC, May 21, 2017: The Times of India]
@@ Line 113: / Line 130: @@
 When the accused tried to play down their alleged role saying were at worst only part of the media cell, HC said, “Dissemination of propaganda in such cases was more lethal than the use of bullets or detonating of an IED.“
 = Fatalities Related to Terror=

@@ Line 6: / Line 6: @@
 |}
-[[Category:India |T]]
-[[Category:Crime |T]]
 = Base Movement=
@@ Line 321: / Line 358: @@
 While Maoists were involved in 295 total attacks in India, only global outfits ahead of them are Al-Shabaab with 353 attacks, Taliban with 703 attacks and Islamic State with 857 attacks.